HR-9129-119
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.
Sponsored by John Moolenaar (R-MI)
What it does
The GUARD Act of 2026 would require national security agencies to evaluate humanoid and quadruped robots — and their control software — produced by entities from countries of concern (such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) to determine whether they pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. If an agency finds such a risk, or fails to complete its review within one year, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) would be required to add those robots to its "covered list" — the same list used to restrict Huawei and ZTE telecommunications equipment. Robots cleared as safe would be exempt from the list, and the bill explicitly excludes robots made by NATO allies and Major Non-NATO Allies.
Who benefits
U.S. national security and intelligence agencies that would gain a formal legal mechanism to restrict adversarial robotics. Domestic robotics manufacturers (e.g., Boston Dynamics, Agility Robotics) that would face reduced competition from foreign-made robots subject to restrictions. U.S. defense and critical infrastructure operators seeking assurance that robots used in sensitive environments are not subject to foreign government influence. Workers in industries where foreign-made robots might otherwise displace domestic alternatives.
Who is hurt
U.S. businesses and research institutions that currently use or plan to purchase lower-cost humanoid or quadruped robots from covered foreign entities — particularly Chinese manufacturers like Unitree Robotics or DEEP Robotics. Academic and university robotics labs that rely on foreign-made platforms for research. Consumers and companies that could face higher prices if lower-cost foreign robots are restricted. Foreign robotics companies headquartered in countries of concern that export to the U.S. market. Importers and distributors of covered foreign robotics equipment.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that humanoid and quadruped robots equipped with cameras, microphones, and wireless communications capabilities are uniquely positioned to collect sensitive data in homes, workplaces, and critical infrastructure — and that robots produced by entities subject to Chinese or Russian government direction pose the same espionage risks that led Congress to restrict Huawei and ZTE. They contend that the U.S. learned a costly lesson by allowing foreign-controlled telecommunications equipment to penetrate critical networks before acting, and that applying the proven FCC covered-list framework proactively to an emerging technology prevents repeating that mistake.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's definition of "covered robotics communications equipment" is broad enough to sweep in robots used for legitimate research, manufacturing, and commercial purposes that pose no realistic espionage risk, and that a blanket review-or-ban default could restrict beneficial technology without evidence of actual harm. They contend that the one-year automatic listing provision — which places all covered robots on the restricted list if agencies simply fail to act — effectively delegates a sweeping trade restriction to bureaucratic inaction rather than affirmative security findings, raising concerns about due process and the major questions doctrine after Loper Bright (2024).
Constitutional context
The bill operates under the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), which grants Congress broad authority to regulate foreign commerce and communications equipment. It extends the existing Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act framework, which has not faced successful constitutional challenge. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts would independently assess whether the FCC's authority to add items to the covered list based on agency inaction — rather than an affirmative finding — falls within the statute's clear authorization.
Checks and balances
The Executive Branch (national security agencies) gains authority to determine which robots are restricted; Congress checks this through mandatory unclassified reporting to eight designated committees, and the FCC serves as the implementing body with its own procedural requirements under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act.
Historical precedent
The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 established the FCC covered list framework that this bill extends, and was used to restrict Huawei and ZTE telecommunications equipment on national security grounds.