HR-9147-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Craig Goldman (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to formally add Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to the geographic scope of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords. It would also allow the Envoy to designate a Deputy Special Envoy with relevant regional expertise, require interagency coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, and explicitly prohibit any new appropriations to fund the expanded duties.
Who benefits
U.S. businesses seeking expanded trade and economic ties with Central Asian and Caucasus nations. Israel, which could gain additional normalized diplomatic and economic relationships in these regions. Central Asian and Caucasus governments interested in closer U.S.-brokered diplomatic frameworks. Defense and energy contractors who may benefit from expanded interagency coordination. The Special Envoy's office, which gains a formal Deputy position and clearer statutory authority. Kazakhstan, which is specifically cited as the first Central Asian signatory to the Abraham Accords.
Who is hurt
Countries or factions that oppose Abraham Accords expansion — including Iran, which has publicly opposed normalization frameworks — may face increased diplomatic pressure. Existing State Department staff whose resources could be stretched by expanded duties with no new funding authorized. Taxpayers and program offices that may absorb indirect administrative costs through reallocation of existing budgets. Nations in the region that are not included in the defined geographic scope may find themselves deprioritized in U.S. diplomatic engagement.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Abraham Accords have already demonstrated measurable success — normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco — and that Kazakhstan's 2025 accession proves the framework can extend beyond the Middle East. They contend that codifying Central Asia and the Caucasus into the Envoy's statutory mandate gives U.S. diplomacy a clearer legal foundation and strategic direction in regions of growing geopolitical importance, particularly as competition with Russia and China intensifies there, while the no-new-funds provision ensures fiscal discipline.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that expanding the Abraham Accords framework to Central Asia and the Caucasus conflates geographically and politically distinct regions with the Israeli-Arab normalization context the Accords were designed for, potentially diluting the diplomatic focus and credibility of the framework. They contend that mandating expanded duties with no additional funding could undermine the Envoy's effectiveness, and that countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia — which have their own complex bilateral conflicts — may not be appropriate fits for a framework centered on Israel-Arab normalization.
Constitutional context
The bill operates within Congress's authority to structure and define the duties of executive branch offices under the Appointments Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2) and its broad power over foreign commerce (Art. I, §8, cl. 3). While the President holds broad recognition and diplomatic powers under the Reception Clause (Art. II, §3), as affirmed in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), Congress has well-established authority to define the scope and mandate of State Department positions through statute.
Checks and balances
The executive branch — specifically the Special Presidential Envoy and the State Department — gains a formally expanded geographic mandate, while Congress retains oversight through the existing statutory framework and the explicit prohibition on new appropriations, limiting the Envoy to existing budgetary authorities.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously used the State Department Basic Authorities Act to create and define the scope of special envoy positions, including the original establishment of the Abraham Accords Envoy role, making this type of statutory modification a routine exercise of congressional authority over diplomatic offices.