HR-9388-119
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)
What it does
This bill would extend an existing pilot program that allows passengers arriving on direct flights from certain pre-approved foreign airports to skip TSA re-screening when connecting to additional domestic flights. It would extend the program's duration from six to ten years and update the conditions under which checked baggage may also bypass re-screening, provided the originating foreign airport used an approved explosives detection system, passengers cannot access their bags in transit, CBP received advance baggage images, and CBP has not flagged the passenger or baggage for further inspection.
Who benefits
International travelers connecting through U.S. airports who would experience shorter connection times and less friction. U.S. airlines and airports that would see reduced congestion at security checkpoints and potentially more competitive international routing options. Foreign airports participating in the program, which may attract more connecting traffic. TSA, which could reallocate screening resources to other passengers. Domestic airports that serve as connection hubs, which may see increased passenger throughput.
Who is hurt
Travelers who prefer maximum domestic re-screening of all international arrivals, who would see that standard not applied to passengers from participating airports. TSA screener workforce, which could face reduced demand for labor at affected checkpoints over time. Non-participating foreign airports, which may be at a competitive disadvantage relative to airports that qualify for the program. Domestic security equipment vendors who might otherwise supply additional screening technology at U.S. connection points.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the program eliminates redundant screening for passengers already vetted at foreign airports that meet U.S. security standards, reducing checkpoint congestion without sacrificing safety. They contend that the four-part safeguard structure — requiring certified explosives detection, baggage access controls, advance CBP image review, and a CBP clearance check — provides layered security equivalent to domestic re-screening, while improving the competitiveness of U.S. hub airports against foreign connecting hubs that offer faster transfers.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that relying on foreign airport screening standards introduces a security dependency on governments and systems outside direct U.S. oversight, and that a data breach or lapse at a participating foreign airport could go undetected before passengers board domestic flights. They contend that extending the program from six to ten years locks in a security architecture for a longer period without requiring Congress to reassess whether foreign screening standards have kept pace with evolving threats, reducing accountability over time.