HR-9394-119
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 712.
Sponsored by Dale Strong (R-AL)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct, within four years, an exercise simulating the smuggling into or deployment within the U.S. of a biological agent targeting the agriculture and food sector. It requires coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial agencies and private-sector food and agriculture operators, and requires an after-action report to Congress with findings and legislative recommendations within 180 days of completion.
Who benefits
The agriculture and food critical infrastructure sector, including farmers, food processors, and distributors who would gain from improved emergency response planning; state, local, and tribal emergency management agencies that would participate in and benefit from federal coordination and training; DHS and other federal agencies that would gain clearer interagency protocols; and consumers who could indirectly benefit from a more resilient food supply chain.
Who is hurt
No group bears a direct negative effect, though DHS and participating federal, state, and private-sector entities would bear staff time and coordination costs to plan and execute the exercise, and taxpayers would fund the exercise and any resulting new programs. Private food and agriculture companies participating may also incur costs from diverting personnel and resources to take part in drills.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the food and agriculture sector remains one of the least-exercised areas of critical infrastructure protection despite being a plausible terrorism target, and that a structured, multi-stakeholder exercise would expose gaps in coordination before a real attack occurs. They contend that requiring an after-action report with legislative recommendations ensures lessons learned translate into concrete policy improvements rather than being shelved.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that DHS already runs numerous preparedness exercises under existing authority and that a new statutory mandate is unnecessary and could duplicate existing programs at additional cost. They contend that Congress should demand evidence of specific agroterrorism threat gaps before mandating a resource-intensive exercise, rather than legislating a scenario-specific requirement that limits DHS's flexibility to prioritize based on current intelligence.
Constitutional context
This bill raises no significant constitutional question; it falls within Congress's authority to direct executive branch agencies through statute and its general power to provide for the common defense under Article I, Section 8.
Checks and balances
Congress directs the executive branch (DHS) to conduct a specific exercise and report back, which is a routine exercise of legislative oversight over agency priorities with no expansion of executive authority beyond existing statutory power.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously mandated similar sector-specific DHS preparedness exercises, such as cybersecurity and pandemic response exercises required under various homeland security statutes.