HR-9447-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Beth Van Duyne (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to require courts to automatically revoke the citizenship of any naturalized U.S. citizen convicted under 18 U.S.C. §2339A (providing material support for terrorism) or §2339B (providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations). The revocation would be mandatory upon conviction — the court would have no discretion to decline it. Once denaturalized, the person would revert to non-citizen status and become subject to deportation proceedings.
Who benefits
The general public and national security interests, to the extent that removing citizenship from terrorism supporters facilitates their deportation. Federal prosecutors, who would gain an automatic additional consequence attached to terrorism convictions. Victims of terrorism and their families, who may view denaturalization as an appropriate consequence. Countries that receive deported individuals may or may not benefit depending on circumstances.
Who is hurt
Naturalized citizens convicted under §2339A or §2339B, including those whose convictions involve indirect or attenuated support (e.g., donations to organizations later designated as terrorist groups). Family members — including U.S.-born children — of denaturalized individuals who may face family separation. Immigrants from countries where return could mean persecution or statelessness, who may face indefinite detention if removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Defense attorneys and civil liberties organizations that may face increased caseloads challenging denaturalization orders. Naturalized citizens broadly, who would hold citizenship on different legal footing than birthright citizens for this category of offense.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that citizenship is a privilege that carries civic obligations, and that providing material support for terrorism — a federal felony — represents a fundamental betrayal of allegiance to the United States that justifies its revocation. They contend that existing denaturalization law already strips citizenship for treason and bearing arms against the U.S. (8 U.S.C. §1451(c)), and that terrorism support is an equally grave threat to national security; extending the same consequence is a logical and proportionate step. They further argue that denaturalization facilitates deportation of convicted terrorism supporters, removing them from U.S. soil and reducing ongoing security risks.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandatory, automatic denaturalization upon conviction — with no judicial discretion — raises serious constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to protect citizenship from being stripped as punishment (Afroyim v. Rusk, 1967; Vance v. Terrazas, 1980). They contend that §2339A and §2339B are broad statutes that have been applied to defendants with attenuated connections to terrorism, meaning automatic denaturalization could reach individuals whose conduct falls far short of active terrorism. They further argue that denaturalization could produce stateless individuals who cannot be deported, leading to indefinite detention that Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) held unconstitutional.
Constitutional context
The Citizenship Clause (14th Amend., §1) and Supreme Court precedent in Afroyim v. Rusk (1967) and Vance v. Terrazas (1980) — not listed in the provided context but directly on point — established that Congress cannot strip citizenship without the individual's voluntary relinquishment. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is also relevant, as mandatory denaturalization with no judicial discretion may raise procedural and substantive due process questions. Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) is directly relevant if denaturalization produces individuals who cannot be removed, as it prohibits indefinite detention when deportation is not reasonably foreseeable.
Checks and balances
The judiciary gains the mandatory duty to revoke citizenship upon conviction, but loses discretion to weigh individual circumstances; the check on this power lies in appellate review of the underlying criminal conviction and potential constitutional challenges to the denaturalization provision itself.
Historical precedent
Existing law (8 U.S.C. §1451(c)) already provides for denaturalization upon conviction for treason, sedition, or bearing arms against the United States, establishing a statutory precedent for citizenship revocation tied to specific criminal convictions.