HR-9714-118
Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 21 - 12.
Sponsored by Ralph Norman (R-SC)
What it does
This bill would require the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to testify at up to two hearings per year before each of the House and Senate Budget Committees, when requested by the committee chair. The hearings could cover any topic the committee chooses, including reviewing how accurate the CBO's budget projections and cost estimates were during the most recently completed fiscal year.
Who benefits
Members of Congress on the House and Senate Budget Committees, who would gain a formal, recurring opportunity to question the CBO Director. Journalists, researchers, and members of the public who follow federal budget policy would benefit from increased public testimony and transparency about CBO's methods and accuracy. Lawmakers seeking to challenge or scrutinize CBO estimates during legislative debates would have a structured forum to do so.
Who is hurt
The CBO Director and CBO staff, who would face mandatory preparation time and resources devoted to congressional testimony, potentially diverting capacity from producing analyses and reports. Committee chairs of the opposing party from the CBO Director's critics could find the hearings used as a political platform rather than a substantive oversight tool. There are no direct financial costs imposed on private citizens or businesses.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the CBO is one of the most influential institutions in federal policymaking — its cost estimates can determine whether major legislation advances or stalls — yet it currently faces no formal, recurring requirement to explain or defend its work before Congress. Mandating annual testimony would give elected representatives a structured opportunity to examine whether CBO's baseline projections proved accurate, question the assumptions behind its models, and hold the office accountable to the legislative branch it serves. Because CBO operates with significant independence, supporters contend that regular oversight hearings are a reasonable and proportionate check on an unelected office whose analyses shape trillion-dollar decisions affecting every American.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the CBO's value to Congress depends precisely on its independence and insulation from political pressure, and that mandatory testimony before partisan-controlled committees could expose the Director to pressure to adjust methodologies or findings to satisfy the majority party. They contend that CBO already publishes detailed public reports, responds to congressional requests, and voluntarily testifies, making a new legal mandate unnecessary. Critics also warn that committee chairs could use the required hearings as a recurring platform to publicly attack CBO estimates they find inconvenient, gradually undermining public confidence in a nonpartisan institution that both parties have historically relied upon for credible budget analysis.
Constitutional context
This bill operates under Congress's broad authority to structure and oversee its own legislative support agencies, rooted in the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, Sec. 8). The CBO was created by statute (Congressional Budget Act of 1974) and Congress retains authority to modify its operating requirements. No Commerce Clause or Takings Clause issues are implicated. The bill does not delegate new regulatory authority to an executive agency, so the major questions doctrine (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022) and post-Chevron deference concerns (Loper Bright v. Raimondo, 2024) are not directly relevant. The Tenth Amendment is not implicated as this bill governs a federal legislative office.
Checks and balances
This bill modestly strengthens the legislative branch's formal oversight capacity over one of its own support agencies. The House and Senate Budget Committees — and specifically their chairs — would gain a codified right to compel testimony from the CBO Director on a recurring basis. No authority shifts to the executive or judicial branch. The change is internal to Congress, reinforcing legislative oversight rather than altering the balance between the three branches of government.
Historical precedent
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the CBO and defined its relationship with Congress. Various oversight statutes have required agency heads and inspectors general to testify regularly before relevant committees, establishing a general precedent for mandatory testimony requirements for federally created offices.