HR-9716-119
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Keith Self (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would prohibit federal law enforcement agencies from accessing surveillance data collected by state or local agencies — such as license plate readers, continuous-coverage cameras, long-range microphones, and similar technologies — without first obtaining a federal warrant. It would establish a "Jurisdictional Wall List" of covered technologies maintained by the Attorney General, limit how long federal agencies may retain such data (generally 30 days, extendable to 90 for good cause), require semiannual public reporting to Congress, and allow individuals to sue the federal government for violations. It would also restrict the use of federal grant funds to purchase listed surveillance technologies unless specific conditions are met.
Who benefits
All U.S. residents who may be captured by state or local surveillance systems, particularly those in heavily surveilled urban areas. Criminal defendants in federal cases who gain stronger suppression rights and Brady disclosure protections for improperly obtained data. Civil liberties advocates and journalists whose First Amendment activities would be explicitly shielded from retaliatory surveillance. Defense attorneys who gain clearer discovery rights under Rule 16. State and local governments that retain greater control over their own surveillance infrastructure. Privacy-focused technology companies whose customers benefit from stronger data protections.
Who is hurt
Federal law enforcement agencies — including the FBI, DEA, ATF, and DHS components — that currently access state and local surveillance data without a warrant, and would face new procedural burdens and litigation exposure. Federal prosecutors whose cases may be weakened if previously accessible surveillance data becomes harder to obtain or is suppressed. State and local governments that receive federal grants and may face new conditions on how they deploy surveillance equipment. Victims of crimes where time-sensitive surveillance data could be critical to investigations but is delayed by warrant requirements. Federal agencies that must absorb compliance, recordkeeping, training, and audit costs.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that federal agencies have routinely exploited a "jurisdictional loophole" — accessing comprehensive surveillance data collected by state and local systems without a warrant, effectively circumventing the Fourth Amendment protections affirmed in Carpenter v. United States (2018), which held that comprehensive location tracking requires a warrant. They contend that license plate readers, continuous-coverage cameras, and similar technologies can reconstruct a person's movements in granular detail, and that allowing warrantless federal access to this data renders Carpenter's protections meaningless. The bill's explicit prohibition on using surveillance data to monitor First Amendment activity addresses documented cases of federal agencies tracking protesters and journalists.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill would create significant operational gaps in federal law enforcement by requiring warrants for data that state and local agencies have already lawfully collected under their own legal frameworks, slowing time-sensitive investigations involving terrorism, trafficking, and violent crime. They contend that the third-party doctrine — under which data voluntarily shared with another party carries reduced privacy expectations — has historically permitted inter-governmental data sharing without a warrant, and that Carpenter's reach to this context remains unsettled. Critics also argue that restricting federal grant funds for listed technologies could defund legitimate public safety infrastructure, including school security systems and highway toll collection, even with the bill's narrow exceptions.
Constitutional context
The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is directly at issue. Carpenter v. United States (2018) held that comprehensive digital location records require a warrant, rejecting the traditional third-party doctrine for data that reveals detailed patterns of life. This bill codifies and extends Carpenter's logic to state and local surveillance data accessed by federal agencies, addressing a gap the Court did not explicitly resolve — whether federal agencies may obtain warrantlessly collected state data to circumvent the warrant requirement.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (federal law enforcement agencies) loses the ability to access state and local surveillance data without judicial authorization; checks include federal court warrant review, Inspector General audits, semiannual congressional reporting, and a private right of action allowing individuals to sue federal agencies for violations.
Historical precedent
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) similarly established warrant requirements for federal access to electronic communications data held by third parties, and has been the subject of ongoing litigation over its application to new technologies.