HR-9731-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Andy Biggs (R-AZ)
What it does
This bill would make any 501(c)(3) nonprofit ineligible to receive Department of Justice grants if two conditions are both true: (1) more than 50% of the nonprofit's revenue came from DOJ grants in the most recently completed tax year, and (2) the nonprofit paid any officer or employee more than the Attorney General's annual salary (currently $221,400). Nonprofits applying for DOJ grants would be required to submit a certification with their application confirming they do not meet both disqualifying conditions.
Who benefits
Taxpayers broadly, according to supporters, who would have greater assurance that federal grant funds are not used to pay nonprofit executives above a federal benchmark. Smaller nonprofits with lower executive compensation that compete for the same DOJ grants and may gain a competitive advantage. DOJ grant programs focused on organizations with leaner administrative structures. Nonprofit organizations that are not heavily DOJ-dependent and thus face no restriction.
Who is hurt
Larger nonprofits that are heavily reliant on DOJ funding and pay senior staff at market rates above $221,400 — including legal aid organizations, victim services providers, anti-trafficking groups, and reentry programs that receive substantial DOJ funding. Employees of those organizations who may face pay cuts or layoffs if their employer restructures to remain eligible. Communities served by those nonprofits if organizations reduce services or close programs to comply. Nonprofits in high cost-of-living areas where competitive salaries for experienced executives routinely exceed the Attorney General's pay. Beneficiaries of DOJ-funded programs — such as crime victims, domestic violence survivors, and formerly incarcerated individuals — if service providers lose funding eligibility.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that nonprofits deriving the majority of their revenue from a single federal agency have effectively become government contractors in all but name, and that paying executives more than the nation's top law enforcement officer — using predominantly taxpayer dollars — is difficult to justify. They contend the bill creates a straightforward, objective standard tied to an existing federal salary benchmark, and that organizations genuinely committed to their missions should be able to attract qualified leadership within that limit. They further argue that the dual-trigger design (both revenue concentration and compensation must exceed the thresholds) narrowly targets the most egregious cases rather than broadly restricting the nonprofit sector.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the Attorney General's salary ($221,400) is set by statute and widely acknowledged to be below private-sector and even many nonprofit market rates for executives managing complex, multi-million-dollar organizations — meaning the cap would effectively disqualify experienced leadership rather than curb waste. They contend that organizations providing specialized legal, social, or victim services require highly credentialed professionals whose compensation reflects labor market realities, and that restricting their funding could reduce service capacity for vulnerable populations. They further argue that the 50% revenue threshold could penalize nonprofits that successfully competed for and won large DOJ grants, creating a perverse incentive to limit grant-seeking even when the organization is the most qualified provider.