HR-9760-119
Referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Scott Peters (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) within the National Security Council, appointed by the President within 120 days of enactment. The CRO would coordinate federal agencies, establish interagency working groups, and produce a National Resilience Strategy within two years — updated every three years — covering how the federal government plans for and responds to natural hazards such as wildfires, sea level rise, drought, and extreme weather. The bill would also create a Partners Council on Resilience with up to 24 members drawn from state, local, tribal, and private-sector entities, and establish a public clearinghouse of resilience data and technical assistance. The bill sunsets after 10 years or after the Comptroller General submits a third assessment report, whichever comes first.
Who benefits
State, local, tribal, and territorial governments that would gain a single federal coordination point and streamlined access to federal resilience funding. Rural and under-resourced communities specifically called out for prioritized technical assistance. Military installations that would benefit from improved natural hazard planning. Nonprofit organizations and private-sector entities involved in disaster preparedness and infrastructure. Communities in high-risk areas (coastal, wildfire-prone, flood-prone) that could receive better-coordinated pre-disaster mitigation. Federal agencies that would gain clearer interagency coordination structures, potentially reducing duplicative spending. Freely Associated States (e.g., Palau, Marshall Islands, Micronesia) explicitly included as non-federal partners.
Who is hurt
Federal agencies that may face new administrative burdens, mandatory participation in working groups, and required resource detailing to the CRO's office. Taxpayers who would bear the cost of the new office, council, and clearinghouse infrastructure, though no specific appropriation is made in the bill. Existing federal resilience programs and offices that could be reorganized, consolidated, or deprioritized under the new strategy. Communities or sectors whose resilience priorities are ranked lower by the CRO may receive less federal attention or funding. Private landowners in areas identified for potential "retreat or relocation" planning could face indirect pressure or reduced property values.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the federal government currently operates dozens of overlapping resilience and disaster preparedness programs across agencies with no unified strategy, leading to inefficiency and gaps in coverage — a problem documented in multiple GAO reports on fragmented federal disaster programs. They contend that natural hazards already cost the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and that pre-disaster mitigation investments return an estimated $6 for every $1 spent according to the National Institute of Building Sciences. They further argue the bill's bipartisan sponsorship, 10-year sunset, and GAO oversight requirements reflect a measured, accountable approach to a genuine national security vulnerability.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that creating a new White House-level coordinating office with authority to direct agency resources and set government-wide spending priorities risks concentrating significant executive power in an unconfirmed presidential appointee with no Senate confirmation requirement. They contend that the bill's broad definition of "natural hazard" — encompassing sea level rise, ocean acidification, and biodiversity loss — effectively embeds a sweeping environmental policy agenda into the national security framework, potentially circumventing the normal legislative process for environmental regulation. They further argue that existing agencies such as FEMA, NOAA, and the Army Corps of Engineers already perform these functions, and that adding a new coordination layer may increase bureaucratic complexity rather than reduce it.