HR-9782-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Sara Jacobs (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of State, working with the Defense Security Cooperation University, to develop a "Security Sector Governance Index" — a scored measurement system assessing how well U.S. security partner countries govern their militaries and police forces. Based on those scores, every partner country would be assigned to one of four tiers, with higher tiers unlocking more types of U.S. security assistance, including lethal equipment and advanced military cooperation. The bill would also authorize multi-year "Security Sector Governance Compacts" — formal agreements with mid-tier countries that commit both sides to specific governance improvement goals in exchange for tailored assistance packages — and establishes a dedicated fund authorized for fiscal years 2027–2031 to support those compacts.
Who benefits
U.S. defense and foreign policy agencies (State Department, DoD) that would gain a structured, codified framework for aid decisions. Mid-tier partner countries (Tiers 2 and 3) that demonstrate governance progress and become eligible for compacts and expanded assistance. Civil society organizations and legislative oversight bodies in partner countries, whose roles are formally recognized in compact design and consultation requirements. Human rights organizations and NGOs consulted in index development. U.S. defense contractors and training institutions that supply equipment and education to partner militaries. Populations in partner countries that may benefit from more accountable, less corrupt security forces. Congressional oversight committees, which receive detailed annual reports and 15-day advance notifications before funds are obligated.
Who is hurt
Partner countries currently receiving broad security assistance that would be downgraded to lower tiers and lose access to certain aid types, including lethal equipment and advanced military cooperation. U.S. strategic partners with poor governance records who rely on security assistance for geopolitical reasons — they may face reduced aid unless a waiver is granted. Countries receiving waivers for five consecutive years would lose eligibility unless Congress acts. Foreign military sales contractors and arms exporters whose markets could shrink if more countries are placed in lower tiers. U.S. combatant commanders who may lose flexibility to work with partners in strategically important but poorly governed regions. Populations in lower-tier countries who might lose access to certain humanitarian or counternarcotics programs if their governments are downgraded.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States currently lacks a consistent, transparent framework for conditioning security assistance on governance quality, leading to aid flowing to partners whose forces commit human rights abuses or misuse U.S.-supplied equipment. They contend that the tiered system and compacts create positive incentives for reform — similar to the Millennium Challenge Corporation model, which has demonstrated measurable governance improvements in recipient countries — while preserving executive flexibility through the waiver mechanism. Supporters further argue that well-governed security partners are demonstrably more effective and reliable, meaning the bill advances U.S. national security interests while reducing the risk that American-origin weapons are misused or transferred illicitly.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that codifying rigid governance tiers into law would constrain the executive branch's ability to respond to fast-moving geopolitical threats, potentially forcing the U.S. to reduce assistance to strategically critical partners — such as those countering near-peer adversaries — based on bureaucratic index scores rather than real-time national security judgments. They contend that the index criteria, including assessments of "civilian oversight" and "merit-based promotions," involve inherently subjective determinations that could be politicized or applied inconsistently across regions. Opponents may also argue that the five-year waiver termination rule effectively transfers foreign policy decision-making authority from the executive to Congress, creating friction in alliances that depend on predictable, long-term U.S. commitments.