HR-9843-119
Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sponsored by Kathy Castor (D-FL)
What it does
This bill would amend the Federal Power Act to establish a framework for allocating the costs of large interstate and offshore electric transmission lines — defined as "transmission facilities of national significance." It would allow entities that own, control, or operate such facilities (those with at least 1,000 megawatts of capacity, or expansions adding at least 500 megawatts) to file cost-allocation tariffs with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The bill would require FERC to ensure those costs are spread across customers in proportion to the benefits they receive, including reliability, economic, public policy, resilience, and other anticipated benefits.
Who benefits
Developers and owners of large interstate and offshore transmission lines, who would gain a clearer regulatory pathway to recover construction costs. Renewable energy developers (particularly offshore wind and large solar projects) whose power often requires long-distance transmission to reach population centers. Electricity consumers in regions that currently lack transmission capacity, who may gain access to cheaper or more reliable power. States with large renewable energy resources that need transmission to export power. Coastal communities and offshore wind project investors who would benefit from a defined cost-allocation mechanism for offshore lines.
Who is hurt
Electricity ratepayers in regions that receive limited direct benefit from a new transmission line but are allocated a share of its costs — particularly if FERC's benefit assessment is disputed. Existing utilities and grid operators whose current cost-allocation arrangements could be disrupted or renegotiated. States and regional transmission organizations (RTOs) that prefer local control over cost-sharing decisions. Ratepayers in states with lower electricity demand growth who may be asked to subsidize transmission built primarily to serve other regions. Competing transmission developers who may face a less level playing field if large incumbents use the tariff process strategically.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the U.S. transmission grid is severely under-built, with the Department of Energy estimating that transmission capacity must roughly double by 2035 to meet reliability and clean energy goals. They contend that the current patchwork of regional cost-allocation rules creates a "chicken-and-egg" problem — developers won't build without cost recovery certainty, and regions won't agree to share costs without a federal framework. By anchoring cost allocation to a benefits-commensurate principle, the bill would ensure that no region pays more than its fair share while removing a key barrier to large-scale grid expansion.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that cost allocation for transmission is inherently contested because "benefits" are difficult to quantify and can be gamed — a broad definition covering "public policy" benefits could force ratepayers in one state to subsidize transmission that primarily serves another state's policy goals. They contend that FERC already has authority to address transmission cost allocation under existing Federal Power Act provisions, and that adding a new statutory layer risks duplicating or conflicting with ongoing FERC rulemaking (Order 1920), creating regulatory uncertainty rather than resolving it. Ratepayer advocates in low-growth regions warn that vague benefit categories could result in inequitable cost burdens.
Constitutional context
The Federal Power Act rests on Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) to regulate interstate electricity transmission. Post-Loper Bright (2024), FERC's interpretation of the new "benefits" standard would receive no automatic judicial deference, meaning courts would independently assess whether FERC's cost-allocation rules stay within the statutory language Congress provides here.
Checks and balances
Congress expands FERC's explicit statutory authority to approve cost-allocation tariffs; FERC exercises that authority through its existing rulemaking and tariff-approval process; federal courts provide judicial review of FERC orders under the Administrative Procedure Act and, post-Loper Bright, apply independent judgment to FERC's statutory interpretations.
Historical precedent
FERC Order 1000 (2011) established federal cost-allocation requirements for transmission planning, but was subject to extensive litigation over whether regions could opt out; this bill would provide explicit statutory authority that Order 1000 lacked.