HR-9975-119
Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Sponsored by Paul Tonko (D-NY)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of Energy to remove escalating amounts of carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere or seawater — starting at 50,000 metric tons per year in 2026–2027 and scaling to 10 million metric tons per year by 2036 and beyond. Removal would be accomplished either directly by the Department of Energy or through competitively awarded contracts with private companies, subject to price-per-ton caps that decrease over time. The bill would also require independent third-party verification of all removal, set standards for eligible technologies, and mandate biennial progress reports to Congress.
Who benefits
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technology companies and startups that would gain a guaranteed federal offtake market. Small CDR businesses, which are guaranteed at least 20% of removal contracts through 2035. Labor organizations, minority-owned businesses, and women-owned businesses that receive priority consideration in contracting. Communities in fossil fuel-dependent regions (coal, oil, gas) that could host CDR projects and gain economic diversification. Domestic supply chain manufacturers whose materials would be preferred. Verification and monitoring firms that would be hired as independent third parties. Broadly, any population that may benefit from reduced atmospheric CO2 concentrations over time.
Who is hurt
Taxpayers who would fund the program, which at $750/ton in early years could cost up to $37.5 million annually at the 2026–2027 scale, rising substantially as volumes increase. Competing federal spending priorities that could be crowded out by open-ended appropriations. Natural photosynthesis-based carbon removal projects (e.g., forestry, soil carbon) that are largely excluded from eligibility. Enhanced oil recovery operators, who are explicitly excluded from using captured CO2 for that purpose. Foreign CDR companies that may be disadvantaged by domestic supply chain preferences. Communities near CDR storage or injection sites that could face localized environmental or land-use impacts.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that direct air capture and ocean-based carbon removal are essential tools for addressing climate change that the private market alone will not deploy at scale without a guaranteed buyer. They contend that creating a federal offtake market — similar to how the government historically catalyzed the semiconductor and aerospace industries — would drive down costs through learning-by-doing, with the bill's price caps declining from $750/ton to $150/ton by 2037, reflecting realistic cost trajectories observed in early commercial projects. They further argue the bill's verification requirements, anti-double-counting rules, and 25% market concentration cap ensure fiscal accountability and competitive integrity.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill authorizes open-ended appropriations ("such sums as are necessary") with no hard spending ceiling, creating an uncapped fiscal commitment at a time when CDR technologies remain largely unproven at scale — current commercial direct air capture costs exceed $400–$1,000 per ton, making the bill's long-term price targets speculative. They contend that excluding natural photosynthesis-based approaches (forestry, soil carbon) arbitrarily narrows the eligible technology pool in favor of capital-intensive engineered solutions, and that mandating geologic-timescale storage requirements may foreclose lower-cost biological removal pathways that could achieve equivalent climate benefits at a fraction of the cost.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to direct federal spending on carbon removal rests on the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8). Because this bill directs the Secretary of Energy — not the EPA — to act, and explicitly authorizes the program through new legislation rather than relying on existing agency interpretations, it is structured to avoid the major questions doctrine concerns raised in West Virginia v. EPA (2022). Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts would independently review any implementing regulations, but the bill's explicit statutory mandates reduce reliance on agency gap-filling.
Checks and balances
The Executive Branch (Department of Energy) gains new procurement and rulemaking authority; Congress retains oversight through mandatory biennial reports, competitive contracting requirements, the 25% market concentration cap, and the requirement that appropriations be authorized — though the open-ended "such sums as necessary" language limits Congress's direct fiscal control.
Historical precedent
The Department of Energy's existing Carbon Dioxide Removal Purchase Pilot Prize and the Regional Direct Air Capture Hubs program (authorized under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021) represent earlier, smaller-scale federal CDR procurement efforts, though neither imposed a mandatory removal obligation on the Secretary at this scale.