S-1268-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Edward Markey (D-MA)
What it does
This bill would require companies with at least $15 billion in annual revenue that hold FAA "Organization Designation Authorization" (ODA) status—meaning the FAA has delegated to them the authority to certify aspects of their own aircraft designs and manufacturing—to include on their board of directors two labor union representatives (including one from each union representing employees involved in aircraft design and manufacturing) and two members with proven aerospace safety experience. The FAA Administrator would be required to rescind ODA status within 90 days for any company that does not certify compliance with these board composition requirements.
Who benefits
Aerospace industry labor unions and their represented workers, who would gain formal board representation and influence over safety-related governance decisions; airline passengers and aviation safety advocates, who proponents argue would benefit from stronger internal safety oversight; and aerospace safety experts who could gain board positions and associated compensation and influence.
Who is hurt
Large aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing, which would bear compliance costs and lose some board composition discretion; existing board members and shareholders, who may see reduced control over board seat selection; and potentially the companies' competitive flexibility in governance, since non-compliant firms would lose FAA self-certification authority and have to rely entirely on direct FAA inspection, which could slow certification timelines and increase costs passed to airlines and consumers.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that after the 737 MAX crashes, investigations found that self-certification arrangements let manufacturers prioritize production speed over safety, and that mandating labor and safety-expert board representation would inject independent, frontline safety perspective into corporate decision-making. They contend that workers who build and inspect aircraft, along with dedicated safety experts, are positioned to flag risks that purely financial or executive-driven boards may overlook, citing congressional investigations into the MAX certification process as evidence of governance failures.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandating specific board composition intrudes on corporate governance decisions traditionally left to shareholders and state corporate law, and that requiring union representatives specifically—rather than independent safety experts generally—could introduce labor-management conflicts of interest into a body meant to oversee broad company strategy. They contend that revoking ODA status for noncompliance could slow FAA certification processes industry-wide, potentially increasing costs and delays for the entire aviation supply chain without clear evidence that board composition changes would have prevented past safety failures.