S-136-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.
Sponsored by Ron Wyden (D-OR)
What it does
This bill would repeal the longstanding U.S. trade embargo on Cuba and lift most restrictions on trade and travel between the two countries. It would grant Cuba normal trade relations status (the same tariff treatment given to most U.S. trading partners), allow unrestricted remittances to Cuba, permit telecommunications carriers to operate between the U.S. and Cuba, and allow U.S. citizens and residents to travel to Cuba without federal restriction. The President would retain authority to impose new export controls or emergency economic measures on Cuba, and would be directed to negotiate settlements for property claims by U.S. nationals and to press for human rights protections.
Who benefits
U.S. exporters (agricultural, manufactured goods, and consumer products) who would gain access to the Cuban market. U.S. importers and retailers who could source Cuban goods, including cigars and rum. American travelers and the tourism industry (airlines, hotels, cruise lines, travel agencies). Cuban Americans who send remittances to family members in Cuba, and their relatives in Cuba who receive them. U.S. telecommunications companies seeking to expand service to Cuba. Cuban businesses and consumers who would gain access to U.S. goods and services. U.S. nationals with unresolved property claims who may benefit from a formal negotiation process.
Who is hurt
U.S. industries that currently benefit from the embargo's competitive exclusion of Cuban products — particularly domestic cigar and rum producers. Advocates for political pressure on Cuba's government who argue the embargo is a key leverage tool. Cuban political dissidents and human rights organizations who believe economic engagement strengthens the Cuban government rather than pressuring it. U.S. companies with trademark claims tied to confiscated Cuban businesses, whose legal position may be complicated by the trademark provision. Geopolitical interests concerned about Cuba's relationships with adversarial nations.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the U.S. embargo on Cuba, in place for over six decades, has failed to produce democratic change while isolating American businesses from a nearby market and separating Cuban American families. They contend that normal trade relations and people-to-people contact have historically been more effective tools for promoting openness than economic isolation, pointing to the normalization of relations with Vietnam and China as examples where trade engagement accompanied gradual political liberalization. They further argue that the bill preserves presidential emergency powers and a human rights negotiation mandate, ensuring engagement does not come without accountability.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that lifting the embargo rewards a government with a documented record of political repression, arbitrary detention, and suppression of free expression, effectively providing economic relief to Cuba's ruling authorities without requiring concrete democratic reforms. They contend that the bill's human rights provisions are aspirational rather than enforceable — the President is directed to "engage" and "secure" protections, but no mechanism conditions trade benefits on measurable progress. They further argue that increased trade revenue could strengthen the Cuban government's capacity to maintain its security apparatus, undermining rather than aiding the Cuban people the bill claims to help.
Constitutional context
The Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) gives Congress broad authority to regulate trade with foreign nations, including the power to impose or lift embargoes. The bill also implicates the President's emergency economic powers — retained here explicitly — which have been tested in courts under statutes like IEEPA. The Reception Clause and recognition power (Art. II, §3), as clarified in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), vest exclusive diplomatic recognition in the President, but Congress controls the trade and commerce framework surrounding that relationship.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority by dismantling the statutory embargo framework it originally created; the President retains a check through preserved emergency powers (including IEEPA) and export control authority, and must report to Congress on property claim negotiations and human rights conditions.
Historical precedent
The U.S. normalized trade relations with Vietnam in 2001 after decades of post-war restrictions, providing a broadly analogous precedent for lifting a comprehensive trade embargo through legislation and executive action.