S-1541-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Mark Kelly (D-AZ)
What it does
The SHIPS for America Act of 2025 would create a sweeping federal program to revitalize the U.S. maritime industry across four major areas: governance, financing, fleet expansion, and workforce development. It would establish a White House-level Maritime Security Advisor and a Maritime Security Board to coordinate policy across more than a dozen federal agencies, and create a Maritime Security Trust Fund — funded partly by tonnage taxes on foreign shipping — to finance the bill's programs. It would expand cargo preference rules requiring more U.S. government and commercially imported goods (including goods from China) to be carried on U.S.-flagged vessels, create new financial incentives and loan guarantees for domestic shipyard construction, and launch workforce programs including student loan forgiveness, academy funding, and credentialing modernization for merchant mariners.
Who benefits
U.S. shipyard owners and workers, who would gain new construction orders, loan guarantees, and financial incentives. Merchant mariners and maritime academy students, who would gain student loan forgiveness, expanded training programs, and improved credentialing pathways. U.S.-flagged shipping companies, who would benefit from cargo preference mandates directing more government and commercial cargo to their vessels. Defense and national security interests, which would gain a larger pool of sealift vessels and trained mariners available in wartime. Port communities and inland waterway-dependent industries, which would benefit from infrastructure investment. Domestic steel and manufacturing suppliers to shipyards. Veterans and military personnel transitioning to maritime careers, who would gain dedicated pipeline programs. Rural and coastal communities economically tied to the maritime sector.
Who is hurt
Foreign shipping companies, particularly Chinese carriers, which would lose cargo currently carried under open-market conditions. U.S. importers and exporters who currently use lower-cost foreign-flagged vessels and would face higher shipping costs if cargo preference mandates expand. American consumers, who may see higher prices on imported goods if shipping costs rise. Agricultural exporters, who have historically opposed cargo preference rules as raising the cost of food aid and commodity shipments. Foreign shipyards and their workers, who would lose orders redirected to U.S. yards. Federal taxpayers broadly, who would fund the Trust Fund programs, loan guarantees, and academy subsidies. Small businesses that rely on cost-competitive international shipping. Countries whose vessels are subject to new tonnage taxes or cargo restrictions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States has allowed its maritime industrial base to atrophy to a dangerous degree — with fewer than 80 U.S.-flagged vessels in international trade compared to over 5,500 Chinese-documented vessels, and only 20 U.S. shipyards capable of building oceangoing ships, down from more than 80 after World War II. They contend that this dependence on foreign-controlled shipping creates a critical national security vulnerability: with only 12,000 U.S. merchant mariners, the country may lack the sealift capacity to sustain a prolonged military conflict, as demonstrated by the logistical challenges of Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea. Supporters further argue that China's deliberate, state-subsidized dominance of global shipbuilding — holding 230 times more capacity than the U.S. — requires a coordinated industrial policy response, and that the bill's combination of financial incentives, cargo preference rules, and workforce investment mirrors the strategies that built U.S. maritime dominance in the 20th century.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that expanding cargo preference mandates — which already require a percentage of government cargo to move on U.S.-flagged ships — has a documented history of raising shipping costs and reducing the efficiency of food aid programs, with USAID and agricultural groups previously estimating that cargo preference rules add hundreds of millions of dollars annually to aid delivery costs. They contend that the bill's approach of using regulatory mandates and subsidies to prop up an uncompetitive domestic industry will ultimately burden U.S. exporters, importers, and consumers with higher costs rather than producing a self-sustaining maritime sector. Critics further argue that the creation of a new White House-level Maritime Security Advisor and a sprawling Maritime Security Board adds bureaucratic complexity without clear accountability, and that the Trust Fund's reliance on tonnage taxes could invite retaliatory measures from trading partners, potentially harming U.S. exporters in other sectors.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to regulate maritime commerce rests firmly on the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and has historically been among the broadest exercises of federal power. The bill's delegation of significant rulemaking and coordination authority to a new Maritime Security Advisor and Board — including authority to set cargo preference regulations and direct agency action — could face scrutiny under the major questions doctrine (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022) and post-Loper Bright independent judicial review (2024) if agencies issue rules of vast economic significance beyond what the bill's text clearly authorizes. Expanded tonnage taxes could also raise Due Process or Takings questions if applied retroactively or in ways that destroy existing contractual arrangements.
Checks and balances
Congress gains significant authority by directing maritime industrial policy through statute and mandatory reporting; the Executive Branch gains a new White House-level coordinating office (Maritime Security Advisor and Board) with broad interagency authority, checked by mandatory congressional reporting, GAO biennial reviews, and the requirement that major expenditures flow through the congressionally authorized Maritime Security Trust Fund.
Historical precedent
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established a similar framework of federal subsidies, cargo preference rules, and workforce programs to build U.S. maritime capacity, and was credited with enabling the massive wartime shipbuilding surge of World War II, though the commercial fleet it supported declined sharply in subsequent decades as subsidies were reduced.