S-185-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Thomas Tillis (R-NC)
What it does
This bill would create a federal civil cause of action allowing crime victims — or their families — to sue state and local governments that have "sanctuary" policies (policies limiting cooperation with federal immigration detainer requests or information sharing). To sue, the victim must have suffered murder, rape, or a felony committed by an unauthorized immigrant who benefited from that sanctuary policy, and the immigrant must have been arrested, convicted, or sentenced to at least one year. The bill would also condition certain federal grants (including Community Development Block Grants and public works grants) on jurisdictions waiving their sovereign immunity to these lawsuits, and would grant local officers who comply with federal immigration detainers legal protection by treating them as federal agents for liability purposes.
Who benefits
Crime victims and their families (spouses, parents, children) who were harmed by unauthorized immigrants in jurisdictions with sanctuary policies. Families of homicide victims who currently have no federal civil remedy against the local government. Federal immigration enforcement agencies (DHS/ICE), which would gain leverage to compel local cooperation. Local law enforcement officers who comply with detainers, who would receive federal liability protection. Rural and suburban communities that favor stricter immigration enforcement.
Who is hurt
State and local governments with sanctuary policies, which would face new financial liability and potential loss of federal grant funding. Taxpayers in those jurisdictions, who would ultimately bear the cost of any judgments or settlements. Unauthorized immigrants who are crime victims or witnesses, who may be less likely to cooperate with local police if trust in local law enforcement erodes — though the bill includes an exception for victim/witness information sharing. Immigrant communities broadly, who may experience increased fear of local law enforcement. Cities and counties that rely on Community Development Block Grants for housing and infrastructure programs, which could lose funding if they decline to change their policies.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that sanctuary policies directly enable preventable crimes by releasing individuals subject to federal detainers back into communities, and that victims of those crimes deserve a legal remedy against the governments whose policies facilitated the harm. They point to high-profile cases — such as the 2015 killing of Kate Steinle in San Francisco — as evidence that detainer non-compliance has real, deadly consequences. They further contend that the bill fills a gap in federal law by giving victims a meaningful avenue for accountability that currently does not exist, while the grant-conditionality mechanism is a constitutionally established tool Congress has long used to encourage state cooperation with federal priorities.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's causal chain — requiring proof that a sanctuary policy specifically caused the harm — is legally tenuous and that local governments cannot be held liable for the independent criminal acts of third parties under established tort principles. They contend that coercing local cooperation through grant conditions and civil liability effectively commandeers state and local governments to enforce federal immigration law, raising serious concerns under the anti-commandeering doctrine established in cases like Printz v. United States and Murphy v. NCAA. They further argue that eroding trust between immigrant communities and local police — by making local officers de facto immigration agents — may reduce crime reporting and cooperation, potentially making communities less safe overall.
Constitutional context
The Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering doctrine, reinforced by Printz v. United States (1997) and Murphy v. NCAA (2018), limits Congress's ability to compel state and local governments to enforce federal law; conditioning federal grants on waiving sovereign immunity and complying with detainers may be challenged on these grounds. Additionally, Arizona v. United States (2012) affirmed broad federal supremacy over immigration enforcement, which supporters argue supports Congress's authority to incentivize local cooperation, while the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause may be implicated for detained individuals held on civil detainers without a judicial warrant.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain leverage over state and local governments through grant conditionality and civil liability exposure; checks include federal and state courts reviewing the constitutionality of the anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity waiver provisions, and the executive branch's discretion in issuing and enforcing detainer requests.
Historical precedent
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) established the framework for federal-local immigration cooperation under 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits jurisdictions from restricting information sharing on immigration status, though courts have split on its enforceability against sanctuary policies.