S-2259-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.
Sponsored by Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)
What it does
This bill would prohibit the operation of "connected vehicles" — internet- or network-enabled vehicles — on Department of Defense property if those vehicles were designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by companies owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign entity of concern (such as China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea). The Secretary of Defense would be required to publish a list of prohibited vehicles by January 1, 2027, with the ban taking effect January 1, 2028. The Secretary would review and update the list annually and must brief Congress on an implementation plan by June 2027.
Who benefits
U.S. military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors on DoD installations who would be protected from potential surveillance or data collection through foreign-linked vehicle systems. U.S.-based and allied-nation vehicle manufacturers who would gain a competitive advantage on military installations. Domestic automotive and technology companies that produce connected vehicles without foreign-entity-of-concern ties. Intelligence and counterintelligence agencies that would have a clearer legal framework for managing this threat vector. Broadly, U.S. national security interests if the threat is as described.
Who is hurt
Owners of affected vehicles — including military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors who personally own connected vehicles from prohibited manufacturers — who would be barred from driving them onto base. Affected foreign vehicle manufacturers and their U.S. dealerships and suppliers. Consumers who purchased these vehicles in good faith and may face reduced resale value or access restrictions. Potentially, lower-income service members who may own more affordable vehicles from affected manufacturers. Businesses operating on or near military installations that use fleet vehicles from affected manufacturers.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that modern connected vehicles collect and transmit vast amounts of data — including location, movement patterns, and audio — and that vehicles linked to foreign adversaries pose a direct espionage risk on sensitive military installations. They contend that the Commerce Department has already identified this threat in existing federal rules on connected vehicle supply chains, and that this bill builds on that framework by giving DoD clear statutory authority to act. They further argue the phased timeline (list by 2027, ban by 2028) gives vehicle owners and the Department adequate time to adjust without compromising security.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill delegates broad, largely unchecked discretion to the Secretary of Defense to determine which vehicles are prohibited, with limited procedural protections for affected vehicle owners — including service members — who have no formal appeal or waiver process specified in the bill. They contend that the definition of "foreign entity of concern" is broad enough to sweep in vehicles with only minor supply chain connections to adversary nations, potentially burdening thousands of individuals who pose no actual security risk. They also argue that enforcement on large, open installations with thousands of daily entrants may be impractical without significant resource investment.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority over military installations and property under Article I, Section 8, which grants it power to raise and regulate the armed forces and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over federal property. No active constitutional tension area is directly implicated; the bill operates within well-established congressional authority over DoD property and does not raise significant separation-of-powers concerns under the Youngstown framework, as it is Congress authorizing — not the Executive acting unilaterally.
Checks and balances
Congress gains authority by setting the statutory prohibition and requiring briefings; the Secretary of Defense gains administrative discretion to build and maintain the prohibited vehicles list, checked by annual review requirements, mandatory congressional briefings, and the requirement to publicly justify any removals from the list.
Historical precedent
The Commerce Department's 2024 rule on connected vehicle supply chains (89 Fed. Reg. 33,424) similarly targeted vehicles with hardware or software linked to foreign entities of concern, providing a direct regulatory analogue at the federal level.