S-2463-115
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 493.
What it does
The BUILD Act of 2018 would create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a new federal agency that channels private-sector money and expertise into economic development in low- and lower-middle-income countries. It would absorb and replace the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and certain functions of USAID. The DFC would offer loans, loan guarantees, equity investments (as a minority investor), insurance, technical assistance, and other financial tools, and would be set to expire on September 30, 2038.
Who benefits
U.S. private businesses and investors seeking to enter or expand in developing markets, who would gain access to government-backed financing and risk insurance. Developing-country governments and populations in low- and lower-middle-income economies, who would receive increased capital flows and infrastructure or business development. U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, as the DFC is designed to advance American strategic objectives abroad. USAID and OPIC personnel whose functions would transfer to the new agency.
Who is hurt
Countries whose governments have repeatedly supported international terrorism, which would be explicitly barred from receiving DFC assistance. Private entities engaged in monopolistic practices, which would also be ineligible. Competitors of U.S. businesses in developing markets, who may face a better-capitalized American rival backed by government financing. Taxpayers, who bear the financial risk if DFC loans, guarantees, or equity investments result in losses. OPIC as an institution, which would be terminated and folded into the new corporation.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the DFC would give the United States a more powerful and flexible tool to compete with state-backed financing from rival nations in developing markets, advancing both economic and national security goals. They contend that by mobilizing private capital rather than relying solely on government grants, the DFC would generate more development impact per taxpayer dollar — and potentially turn a profit through fees and loan repayments. Supporters also argue that consolidating OPIC and relevant USAID functions into a single, modernized agency would eliminate bureaucratic duplication, streamline decision-making, and allow the U.S. to respond more nimbly to development opportunities. They further note that the 2038 sunset clause and the minority-investor-only equity rule build in accountability and limit taxpayer exposure.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the DFC would primarily subsidize large U.S. corporations seeking profitable overseas ventures, with development benefits for poor countries serving as a secondary justification rather than a genuine priority. They contend that government-backed financing distorts private markets by giving politically connected firms an unfair advantage, and that taxpayers would be left holding the risk when investments in unstable developing economies go wrong. Opponents also argue that consolidating agencies could reduce specialized expertise and oversight, and that the DFC's broad mandate — spanning loans, equity stakes, insurance, and technical assistance — lacks sufficient congressional controls to prevent mission creep or politically motivated investment decisions. They further question whether a U.S. government finance agency can meaningfully out-compete established state-backed rivals in markets where those rivals have deeper relationships and fewer restrictions.
Constitutional context
The DFC operates at the intersection of several constitutional provisions. Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8) and appropriate funds underlies the agency's creation and capitalization. The President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief powers (Art. II) are relevant because the DFC is explicitly tied to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The Appointments Clause (Art. II, Sec. 2) governs how DFC leadership is selected. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) is relevant to the boundary between executive and legislative authority over foreign policy. Trump v. Hawaii (2018) is relevant to the scope of executive discretion in implementing foreign policy through agency action.
Checks and balances
The executive branch gains a new, consolidated agency with broad discretionary authority to deploy financial tools across developing nations, strengthening its hand in foreign economic policy. Congress retains authority through the appropriations process, the 2038 statutory sunset, and the explicit eligibility restrictions (e.g., terrorism-sponsoring countries, monopolistic entities). The minority-investor-only equity rule limits unilateral executive action in acquiring controlling interests in foreign entities. Overall, the bill shifts some foreign development finance authority from a fragmented multi-agency structure toward a more unified executive-branch instrument.
Historical precedent
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), established in 1971, is the direct predecessor and is terminated by this bill. The Export-Import Bank (est. 1934) provides a comparable model of government-backed financing for U.S. business interests abroad. The Marshall Plan (1948) represents an earlier large-scale U.S. government effort to direct capital into foreign economic development.