S-2684-119
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 242.
Sponsored by Jeff Merkley (D-OR)
What it does
This bill would direct the Secretary of State to establish a mechanism to track and respond to Chinese infrastructure and development projects in countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It would require semiannual and annual reports to Congress on Chinese influence activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and mandate briefings on U.S. efforts to counter Chinese influence operations targeting Taiwan and on military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. It would also express U.S. policy in support of Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies in the Western Hemisphere and encourage coordination between U.S. embassies and Taiwan's representative offices in the region.
Who benefits
Taiwan's government and its seven remaining diplomatic allies in Latin America and the Caribbean (currently including Paraguay, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Marshall Islands, Palau, and others). U.S. businesses and allies that benefit from a stable regional order less influenced by Chinese state-backed financing. Latin American and Caribbean governments that may receive increased U.S. diplomatic and technical support. U.S. national security and foreign policy agencies that would gain a clearer mandate and reporting structure. Taiwanese media, civil society, and private-sector entities that would receive U.S. assistance in countering influence operations.
Who is hurt
The People's Republic of China, whose infrastructure and development activities in the region would face increased U.S. monitoring and diplomatic countermeasures. Latin American and Caribbean governments that have switched or may wish to switch diplomatic recognition to China could face U.S. diplomatic pressure. State Department staff would bear new administrative and reporting burdens. U.S. taxpayers could bear indirect costs of expanded diplomatic programming, though no specific appropriations are made in the bill. Countries that have already switched recognition to China (such as Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) may face strained U.S. relations.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that China has systematically used opaque infrastructure financing — often called "debt-trap diplomacy" — to pressure Taiwan's remaining allies into switching recognition, eroding Taiwan's international standing and undermining sovereign decision-making in the Western Hemisphere. They contend that the bill fills a critical gap by requiring the executive branch to monitor and respond to these activities in a structured, congressionally accountable way, and that strengthening Taiwan's diplomatic position deters Chinese military adventurism in the Taiwan Strait, which the bill's deterrence briefing provision directly addresses.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill risks entangling the United States in a diplomatic conflict with China over a region where U.S. leverage is limited, potentially straining relations with Latin American governments that have legitimate economic reasons to engage with Chinese investment. They contend that the bill's findings characterize Chinese development financing as inherently coercive without distinguishing between predatory and legitimate projects, and that mandating a U.S. counter-posture could provoke retaliatory Chinese pressure on U.S. economic and security interests in Asia and elsewhere, at a cost that the bill does not assess.