S-291-119
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 630.
Sponsored by Alex Padilla (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would amend the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 to create a Treasury account for the non-federal (state) contributions to the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program. Existing unspent state contributions would be moved from the general fund into the account within 90 days, future contributions would be deposited there, and the Treasury Secretary could invest idle balances in U.S. government obligations. Money in the account, including interest, would be available to the Interior Secretary without further appropriation, and the states would not bear investment losses.
Who benefits
The three Lower Basin State Parties (Arizona, California, Nevada) and their participating water and power agencies, whose contributions would earn interest and be shielded from investment losses. The conservation program, which would gain a steadier funding stream that does not depend on annual appropriations. Protected species and habitat along the lower Colorado River, which may benefit from additional funds. Water and power users in the region who rely on the program's Endangered Species Act compliance coverage for river operations.
Who is hurt
No group appears to be directly harmed. The federal government would bear any investment losses and would forgo the flexibility of keeping these funds in the general fund. Congressional appropriators would lose annual oversight of this spending, since the money would be available without further appropriation. Taxpayers could bear small indirect costs if interest paid to the account exceeds what the funds would otherwise earn the Treasury.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue the bill fixes a gap in which state-contributed money sits idle without earning returns, so the program loses purchasing power over its multi-decade life. They contend that the 2005 funding agreement already commits the states to the cost share, that investing only in U.S. obligations is low risk, and that making funds available without further appropriation gives a multi-state species-protection effort predictable funding.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that spending without further appropriation weakens Congress's routine oversight of how money is used, even when the funds originate with the states. They contend that having the federal government absorb investment losses shifts risk to taxpayers, and that moving existing balances out of the general fund sets a precedent for other cost-shared programs to seek similar insulated accounts.
Constitutional context
The bill rests on Congress's Spending Clause and Property Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 1; Art. IV, §3, cl. 2) and the Appropriations Clause (Art. I, §9, cl. 7), which requires spending to be authorized by law; here Congress itself would make the funds available by statute. It raises no significant constitutional dispute, and no landmark case squarely governs this routine account-management change.
Checks and balances
Congress would give the Interior and Treasury Secretaries standing authority to spend and invest these funds without annual appropriations, reducing legislative control, though Congress could amend the statute at any time and the program remains subject to the 2005 agreement and oversight.
Historical precedent
Section 9402 of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 authorized this program's federal participation, and Congress has created other no-further-appropriation accounts for cost-shared water and habitat programs.