S-3018-119
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 499.
Sponsored by Ted Cruz (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to permit Taiwanese military members and government representatives — including those from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) — to display Taiwan's flag and military unit emblems or insignia while in the United States. The permitted uses would include wearing official uniforms, conducting ceremonies or functions, and appearing on State Department and Defense Department social media accounts. The bill includes a rule of construction stating that it would not change the existing U.S. "One China Policy," as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.
Who benefits
Taiwanese military personnel and government officials visiting the United States, who would be able to display national symbols in official settings. TECRO staff, who serve as Taiwan's de facto diplomatic representatives in the U.S. U.S. defense and diplomatic officials who engage with Taiwanese counterparts and could publicly document those engagements. U.S. defense contractors and industries with ties to Taiwan's security sector, who may benefit from a more visible U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Taiwanese-American communities who may view the policy as symbolic recognition of Taiwan's distinct identity.
Who is hurt
The People's Republic of China (PRC), which views any official display of Taiwan's flag as a challenge to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, may respond with diplomatic or economic countermeasures. U.S. businesses with significant operations or supply chains in China could face indirect harm if the bill triggers a deterioration in U.S.-China relations. U.S. diplomatic personnel managing the U.S.-China relationship may face increased friction. Americans broadly could be indirectly affected if the bill contributes to geopolitical tensions that affect trade, security, or financial markets.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States maintains robust unofficial relations with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, including arms sales and security cooperation, and that prohibiting Taiwan's flag in official settings creates an inconsistency — the U.S. engages Taiwan as a de facto partner while symbolically suppressing its national identity. They contend the bill's explicit rule of construction preserves the One China Policy framework, meaning the change is a practical accommodation for military and diplomatic protocol rather than a shift in formal recognition. They further argue that visible U.S.-Taiwan engagement strengthens deterrence and signals U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that even with the rule of construction, permitting official display of Taiwan's flag on U.S. government platforms and at U.S.-hosted ceremonies sends a symbolic signal that could be interpreted by Beijing as a step toward formal recognition — precisely the kind of provocation that risks escalating cross-strait tensions. They contend that the U.S. has carefully managed ambiguity in its Taiwan policy for decades to preserve stability, and that legislatively mandating flag display removes executive flexibility to calibrate those signals. They further argue that the potential diplomatic and economic costs of heightened U.S.-China friction could outweigh the symbolic benefits.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive over foreign policy. Under Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), the President holds exclusive recognition power, and Congress cannot override it. By directing the Secretaries of State and Defense to permit flag displays, Congress is arguably regulating the conduct of foreign relations — an area where the executive branch has traditionally held broad discretion. The bill's rule of construction attempts to insulate it from a recognition-power challenge by explicitly stating it does not alter the One China Policy.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority by directing executive branch agencies (State and Defense) on a specific foreign policy protocol; the executive branch retains broader recognition and foreign relations powers, and the President could potentially challenge the mandate as an encroachment on exclusive presidential recognition authority under Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015).
Historical precedent
The Taiwan Travel Act (2018) similarly directed the executive branch to permit high-level visits between U.S. and Taiwanese officials, representing a comparable congressional effort to shape the conduct of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations without formally altering the One China Policy.