S-330-119
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
Sponsored by John Curtis (R-UT)
What it does
This bill would require the President to impose economic sanctions — including asset freezes and visa revocations — on Chinese individuals and entities that have engaged in a pattern of significant theft of U.S. intellectual property, or that have received stolen U.S. intellectual property. It would also broadly bar senior Chinese Communist Party officials, their spouses and children, cabinet members, and active-duty People's Liberation Army members from receiving U.S. visas, regardless of IP theft involvement. The President could waive sanctions on a case-by-case basis by certifying to Congress that doing so is in the national security interest.
Who benefits
U.S. companies and inventors whose intellectual property has been stolen, particularly in technology, pharmaceuticals, defense, and manufacturing sectors. Small businesses that lack resources to pursue IP theft through litigation. U.S. workers in industries undercut by competitors using stolen technology. Domestic competitors of Chinese firms that have gained market advantages through stolen IP. U.S. national security interests broadly, if sanctions deter state-sponsored IP theft.
Who is hurt
Chinese nationals and entities targeted by sanctions, including those who may dispute the determination. Chinese Communist Party officials and their family members who would lose U.S. visa access regardless of personal involvement in IP theft. U.S. universities and research institutions that host Chinese students, scholars, and researchers who could be swept into visa restrictions. U.S. businesses with Chinese partners or supply chain relationships that could be disrupted by asset-blocking sanctions. American consumers who may face higher prices if Chinese goods or services become less accessible. Diplomatic and trade negotiators who may lose leverage if broad restrictions foreclose engagement.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that China's systematic theft of U.S. intellectual property costs the American economy an estimated $225–$600 billion annually, according to the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, and that existing legal tools have failed to deter state-sponsored theft at scale. They contend that mandatory sanctions — rather than discretionary ones — close a gap in current law by creating binding consequences for IP theft and that the visa bar on senior CCP officials applies direct pressure on the decision-makers who oversee or tolerate these programs.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's broad definitions — covering entities that merely "received" stolen IP through others' actions — could ensnare companies with no direct role in theft, raising due process concerns about sanctions imposed without adjudication. They contend that blanket visa bans on all senior CCP officials, their spouses, and children, regardless of any connection to IP theft, are overbroad and could damage diplomatic channels needed to negotiate the very IP protections the bill seeks to enforce, while also affecting family members who bear no individual responsibility.
Constitutional context
The bill relies on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for its asset-blocking sanctions, which draws on Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and the President's executive power. The visa restriction provisions engage the President's broad entry-restriction discretion affirmed in Trump v. Hawaii (2018), which applied rational basis review to national-security-based entry bars. The mandatory nature of the sanctions — directing the President to act — creates tension with the executive's traditional primacy in foreign affairs recognized in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015).
Checks and balances
The executive branch gains expanded sanctioning authority, but Congress retains oversight through mandatory reporting requirements, waiver certification requirements, and the existing IEEPA framework; targeted persons have no explicit statutory appeal mechanism within the bill itself.
Historical precedent
The Magnitsky Act (2012) and the Global Magnitsky Act (2016) established the precedent of using targeted asset-blocking sanctions and visa bans against foreign individuals for human rights abuses and corruption, using a similar IEEPA-based framework.