S-3356-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Sponsored by Edward Markey (D-MA)
What it does
The HALT Act of 2025 would establish U.S. policy to pursue multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations, including a global freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment. It would prohibit the use of any federal funds — past or future — for explosive nuclear weapons tests unless the President first reports to Congress on any change in the condition of the nuclear stockpile and Congress then passes a joint resolution specifically approving the test. The bill would not restrict non-explosive stockpile stewardship activities.
Who benefits
U.S. residents broadly, to the extent reduced nuclear risk lowers the probability of nuclear conflict. Arms control advocacy organizations and diplomats who favor multilateral disarmament frameworks. Countries that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and seek U.S. leadership on disarmament obligations. International monitoring bodies such as the CTBTO, whose verification role would be elevated. Communities near former U.S. nuclear test sites (e.g., Nevada, Pacific Islands) who have historically borne environmental and health burdens from testing. Allies who favor a no-first-use posture as a signal of restraint.
Who is hurt
The executive branch, which would lose unilateral authority to conduct nuclear tests without congressional approval. Defense contractors and national laboratories involved in nuclear weapons development programs that could be constrained by a freeze policy. Military planners who rely on flexible nuclear posture options, including launch-on-warning configurations. Allies (e.g., Japan, South Korea, NATO members) who depend on extended nuclear deterrence and may view no-first-use commitments as weakening security guarantees. Countries skeptical of arms control verification, whose cooperation would be required for any multilateral freeze to function. Taxpayers who have already funded nuclear modernization programs that could be curtailed.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States is legally obligated under Article VI of the NPT to pursue good-faith nuclear disarmament negotiations, and that this bill operationalizes that commitment with concrete policy goals. They contend that the CTBTO's 300-station monitoring network has demonstrated it can detect all nuclear tests — including all six North Korean tests — making explosive U.S. testing unnecessary, a view endorsed by former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and confirmed by annual stockpile certification reports. They further argue that requiring a congressional joint resolution before any nuclear test restores the constitutional balance between branches on matters of existential national security consequence.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that unilateral U.S. restraint on nuclear testing and posture — while Russia develops new delivery systems outside existing treaty frameworks and China expands its arsenal — could erode deterrence credibility and embolden adversaries. They contend that requiring a joint resolution of Congress before any nuclear test creates a dangerous procedural delay in scenarios where rapid stockpile certification may be militarily necessary, effectively transferring Commander-in-Chief authority over nuclear readiness to the legislative branch. They further argue that the bill's policy goals, including no-first-use commitments and launch-on-warning restrictions, could undermine the ambiguity that underpins extended deterrence for U.S. treaty allies.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates the separation of powers between Congress and the President in the foreign policy and national security domains. The Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) grants the President broad authority over military readiness, while the Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) and the congressional power of the purse give Congress tools to constrain military activities. The bill's funding prohibition is a classic exercise of Congress's appropriations power, which courts have consistently upheld as a legitimate check on executive action. The Treaty Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2) is also relevant: the bill calls on the President to seek Senate ratification of the CTBT, and under Medellín v. Texas (2008), any resulting treaty would require implementing legislation to be enforceable as domestic law.
Checks and balances
The executive branch loses unilateral authority to conduct nuclear tests, as the bill requires a joint resolution of Congress — giving the legislative branch a direct veto — before any explosive nuclear test can be funded or prepared.
Historical precedent
The Nuclear Freeze Resolution (H.J.Res. 13, 1983) proposed a similar bilateral freeze on nuclear weapons but was defeated in the House; the HALT Act's funding prohibition mechanism is more analogous to the Boland Amendments (1982–1984), which used appropriations restrictions to constrain executive military activities.