S-3360-119
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 328.
Sponsored by Jacky Rosen (D-NV)
What it does
This bill would require the Secretary of State, in consultation with the FCC and the Department of the Treasury, to submit a report to Congress within 120 days of enactment. The report would assess the feasibility of using technologies — including direct-to-cell wireless, low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet, and commercial off-the-shelf devices — to provide Iranians with uncensored internet access. It would also analyze threats such as drone-based jamming, survey telecom providers operating in Iran, and evaluate security risks for Iranian users of these technologies. The report would be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
Who benefits
Iranian citizens who lack free internet access due to government censorship or shutdowns, particularly those who participated in or supported the January 2026 protests. Iranian civil society organizations and journalists. U.S. and allied satellite and telecommunications companies (e.g., LEO satellite providers) whose technologies could be recommended for expanded use or grant eligibility. Human rights and democracy advocacy organizations focused on Iran. U.S. policymakers and intelligence agencies who would gain a structured assessment of available tools and vulnerabilities.
Who is hurt
The Iranian government, which could face increased pressure or scrutiny based on the report's findings. U.S. companies with existing commercial ties to Iranian state-controlled telecom providers, who could face reputational or regulatory risk if identified in the survey. Competing technology providers whose products are not recommended for grant eligibility. Taxpayers bear the administrative cost of producing the report, though this cost would likely be minimal.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Iran has repeatedly shut down the internet during periods of civil unrest — including during the January 2026 protests — leaving millions of Iranians cut off from the outside world and from each other. They contend that a structured, interagency feasibility assessment is a prudent first step before committing resources, ensuring that any U.S.-backed technology program is technically sound, cost-effective, and does not inadvertently expose Iranian users to greater physical or digital danger from the Iranian government.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a report-only bill is an insufficient response to a well-documented and ongoing problem, and that Congress already commissioned a similar strategy under the FY2025 NDAA (22 U.S.C. 8754a), making this largely duplicative. They contend that the bill's classified annex provisions and security vulnerability assessments could, if improperly handled, expose the very Iranian civil society actors it aims to help, and that without accompanying funding or enforcement mechanisms, the report is unlikely to produce meaningful change on the ground.
Constitutional context
This bill falls squarely within Congress's foreign affairs and foreign commerce powers under Article I, §8. It does not raise significant constitutional tension — it directs an executive branch report rather than overriding presidential recognition power (Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 2015) or imposing binding treaty obligations (Medellín v. Texas, 2008). Congressional oversight of executive branch foreign policy activities through reporting requirements is a well-established legislative tool.
Checks and balances
Congress gains information and oversight leverage through the required report; the executive branch (Secretary of State, FCC, Treasury) retains full discretion over how to respond to the report's findings, and no action is mandated beyond the report itself.
Historical precedent
Section 5124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a) previously required a similar internet freedom strategy for Iran, making this bill a direct supplement to existing law rather than a first-of-its-kind measure.