S-373-118
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 576.
Sponsored by Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
What it does
The RISEE Act would redirect a portion of federal revenues from offshore wind leases, offshore oil and gas leases, and onshore energy and mineral resources to coastal states. States adjacent to offshore wind projects would receive shares calculated by a formula based on their distance from the project site. The bill would also remove the existing cap on oil and gas revenue sharing under the 2006 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act and eliminate an administrative fee the Department of the Interior currently charges to run the onshore revenue-sharing program. States would be required to spend the funds on specific purposes, including coastal restoration, conservation, and infrastructure.
Who benefits
Coastal states adjacent to offshore wind and oil and gas lease sites — particularly Gulf Coast states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama) already receiving oil and gas shares, and Atlantic and Pacific coastal states near offshore wind development. State and local governments that would receive new or increased revenue streams. Coastal communities that would see spending on restoration, conservation, and infrastructure projects. Environmental and conservation organizations that work on coastal restoration. Construction and infrastructure contractors in coastal regions. Fishing and tourism industries that depend on healthy coastal ecosystems.
Who is hurt
The federal Treasury, which would receive a smaller share of offshore energy revenues currently deposited in full. Inland states, which would not receive a share of these revenues despite federal lands and waters being nationally owned. Taxpayers who rely on federal revenue for other programs, to the extent the redirected funds are not offset. The Department of the Interior, which would lose the administrative fee it currently uses to fund the onshore revenue-sharing program, potentially straining its administrative budget. States or localities that do not border offshore energy zones and would receive no direct benefit.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that coastal states bear the direct environmental and economic burdens of offshore energy development — including risks of spills, habitat disruption, and infrastructure strain — while the federal government captures most of the revenue. Sharing that revenue with affected states would give them the resources to address those local impacts through coastal restoration and resilience projects. Supporters also contend that the existing cap on Gulf of Mexico oil and gas revenue sharing is an outdated restriction that has prevented Gulf Coast states from fully funding critical wetland and shoreline restoration. By treating offshore wind revenue the same way as oil and gas revenue, the bill would create a consistent, technology-neutral framework that encourages states to support all forms of offshore energy development, accelerating the buildout of domestic energy production. Eliminating the administrative fee would ensure more of the onshore revenue-sharing dollars actually reach states rather than being consumed by overhead.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that offshore waters and the Outer Continental Shelf are federal public assets owned by all Americans, not just coastal residents, and that redirecting their revenues to a handful of states amounts to a windfall for some states at the expense of the national treasury and inland states. They contend that reducing federal revenue could force cuts to other federal programs or increase the deficit, shifting costs onto all taxpayers. Critics may also argue that tying state spending to specific categories like coastal restoration limits state flexibility and creates a new layer of federal conditions on state budgets. Some may raise concerns that removing the cap on Gulf of Mexico oil and gas revenue sharing could incentivize states to push for expanded fossil fuel extraction to maximize their share, potentially working against climate and conservation goals. Eliminating the Interior Department's administrative fee without a replacement funding mechanism could also degrade the agency's ability to manage the onshore revenue-sharing program effectively.
Constitutional context
The bill rests primarily on Congress's authority over federal property under the Property Clause (Art. IV, Sec. 3) and its Commerce Clause power over navigable waters and the Outer Continental Shelf. Revenue-sharing arrangements with states implicate the Spending Clause (Art. I, Sec. 8), including conditions attached to state use of funds. The Tenth Amendment is relevant to the extent the bill's spending conditions could be seen as coercive, though revenue sharing is generally considered voluntary. Post-Loper Bright (2024), any Interior Department rulemaking to implement the distance-based formula would be subject to independent judicial review rather than deference, meaning courts would assess whether the statutory text clearly authorizes the agency's chosen methodology. West Virginia v. EPA (2022) and the major questions doctrine could be invoked if Interior's implementation rules are seen as having broad economic significance beyond what Congress clearly authorized.
Checks and balances
The bill would shift fiscal authority from the executive branch (Treasury and Interior) to state governments by redirecting revenue streams that currently flow entirely to the federal government. Congress would be exercising its Property Clause and Spending Clause authority to restructure how federal energy revenues are allocated. The Department of the Interior would gain a new administrative role in calculating and disbursing the distance-based formula payments to states, but would lose discretion over the onshore fee structure. State legislatures would gain new spending authority, subject to federally mandated use restrictions.
Historical precedent
The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) established the existing framework for sharing offshore oil and gas revenues with Gulf Coast states — the same cap this bill would remove. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 created the foundational onshore revenue-sharing model between the federal government and states. The Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (1965) provides a comparable model of directing federal energy revenues toward conservation purposes.