S-4162-116
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 589.
Sponsored by Deb Fischer (R-NE)
What it does
The AIR Act of 2020 would temporarily change how the Department of Transportation distributes Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Instead of using recent passenger numbers — which dropped sharply due to the COVID-19 pandemic — airports would receive funding based on whichever year's passenger counts (2018, 2019, or the prior fiscal year) produces the highest grant amount. The bill would also prevent the FAA from using pandemic-era aircraft traffic declines in FY2020 and FY2021 when calculating whether a contract air traffic control tower qualifies to remain in the FAA's Contract Tower Program.
Who benefits
Commercial airports of all sizes, particularly small and mid-size airports that depend heavily on AIP grants and whose passenger numbers fell sharply during the pandemic. Airport sponsors (typically local governments or airport authorities) that would otherwise receive reduced federal funding. Private companies that staff contract air traffic control towers under the Contract Tower Program, who would be shielded from losing program eligibility due to pandemic-driven traffic drops. Communities served by those contract towers, which could otherwise lose staffed air traffic control services.
Who is hurt
Airports that maintained relatively higher passenger traffic during the pandemic years could receive a proportionally smaller share of AIP funds if pre-pandemic baselines are used to calculate other airports' apportionments, since AIP funds are distributed from a fixed pool. Taxpayers who fund the AIP could see grants flow to airports based on historical rather than current usage levels. Contract towers that were already marginal performers before the pandemic would continue to receive benefit-cost analysis protection, potentially keeping lower-efficiency towers in the program longer than they would otherwise remain.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented, temporary collapse in air travel that had nothing to do with an airport's long-term viability or importance to its community. Using pandemic-era passenger counts to determine federal airport funding would punish airports for circumstances entirely outside their control, potentially triggering a cycle of reduced funding, deferred maintenance, and diminished capacity precisely when airports need to be ready for travel demand to recover. Similarly, allowing the FAA to disqualify contract air traffic control towers based on pandemic traffic lows would eliminate safety infrastructure that communities depend on, based on a statistical anomaly rather than genuine long-term need. The bill would ensure that funding and program eligibility decisions reflect an airport's true, sustainable role in the national aviation system.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that directing federal grant dollars based on pre-pandemic passenger counts rather than actual current usage misallocates limited public funds — sending more money to airports serving fewer travelers than the formula would otherwise reflect. If the purpose of AIP funding is to match infrastructure support to real demand, using inflated historical baselines undermines that logic and may direct resources away from airports or projects with greater present need. Similarly, shielding contract towers from benefit-cost analysis during the pandemic years could extend federal program participation for towers that were already struggling to meet efficiency thresholds before COVID-19, effectively using the pandemic as cover to avoid accountability reviews that serve a legitimate public interest in program integrity.
Constitutional context
The bill operates under Congress's broad authority to spend for the general welfare (Article I, Section 8) and to regulate interstate commerce (Commerce Clause). Airport infrastructure and air travel are quintessentially interstate in nature, placing this legislation well within the scope affirmed in Wickard v. Filburn (1942) and distinguished from the limits set in United States v. Lopez (1995). The bill directs DOT and the FAA to apply specific formulas and prohibitions, which limits agency discretion rather than expanding it — a structure that aligns with post-Loper Bright (2024) and West Virginia v. EPA (2022) expectations that major policy choices be made by Congress rather than delegated broadly to agencies.
Checks and balances
The bill shifts authority toward Congress and away from the executive branch by prescribing specific funding formulas and prohibiting the FAA from using certain data in its benefit-cost calculations. DOT and the FAA would have reduced discretion in how they administer the Airport Improvement Program and the Contract Tower Program for the covered fiscal years. This is consistent with the post-Loper Bright environment in which courts expect Congress to make consequential policy determinations explicitly, rather than leaving them to agency interpretation.
Historical precedent
Congress used similar "hold harmless" baseline adjustments for Medicaid and other formula-driven federal grants following the 2008–2009 financial crisis, protecting state and local recipients from funding cuts caused by temporary economic downturns rather than structural changes in need or usage.