S-4391-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
Sponsored by Cory Booker (D-NJ)
What it does
The Farmland for Farmers Act of 2026 would prohibit corporations, pension funds, investment funds, and other non-individual legal entities from acquiring new ownership interests in U.S. agricultural land. Entities already owning farmland at enactment could keep it but would be barred from USDA programs and Farm Credit System loans. Exceptions include small farmer cooperatives, nonprofits, universities, municipal governments, heirs' property entities, and legal entities with 25 or fewer members who are all actively engaged in farming. Violations would be enforced through required divestiture, civil penalties up to twice the land's fair market value, and criminal penalties of up to five years imprisonment for knowing violations.
Who benefits
Independent family farmers and beginning farmers who compete with institutional buyers for land purchases. Rural communities that supporters argue benefit from owner-operated farms. Heirs' property owners, who receive an explicit exemption. Farmer and rancher cooperatives meeting the bill's criteria. State attorneys general, who gain new enforcement authority. Farmland conservation advocates. Prospective first-generation farmers who may face lower land prices if institutional demand is reduced.
Who is hurt
Institutional investors — including pension funds, REITs, mutual funds, and private equity — that currently invest in or plan to invest in farmland as an asset class. Pension fund beneficiaries (retirees and workers) whose funds hold or seek farmland as a portfolio diversification tool. Corporate agribusinesses that own land directly. Existing corporate farmland owners who would be barred from USDA programs and Farm Credit System access. Large farming operations structured as multi-layered LLCs or corporations. Foreign investors in U.S. agricultural land. Landowners who may see reduced buyer competition and potentially lower sale prices. Agricultural lenders whose loan portfolios include corporate-owned farmland.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that institutional ownership of farmland has grown dramatically — from under $2 billion to over $16 billion in market value between 2005 and 2025 — driving farmland prices to nearly double and pricing out independent farmers who cannot compete with well-capitalized institutional buyers. They contend that corporate owners prioritize short-term financial returns over long-term land stewardship and community benefit, threatening both food security and the generational wealth that family farms represent. Supporters further argue that over 30 states already have some form of corporate farming restriction, demonstrating a broad, established policy tradition that this bill would extend to the federal level.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that restricting institutional ownership reduces the pool of buyers for farmland, which could harm retiring farmers who rely on competitive land sales to fund their retirement and may reduce overall agricultural investment. They contend that pension funds and institutional investors provide liquidity and capital stability to rural land markets, and that forcing divestiture of existing holdings could depress land values in affected regions. Opponents also argue that the bill's broad definition of "unauthorized legal entity" could ensnare legitimate family farming structures — such as multi-generational LLCs — and that the criminal penalty provisions raise due process concerns, particularly given the complexity of determining compliance across layered ownership structures.
Constitutional context
Congress invokes the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) explicitly in Section 7, relying on the interstate economic scope of corporate farmland ownership to justify federal regulation of land transactions that are traditionally governed by state law. Under Wickard v. Filburn (1942), aggregated economic activity — even local — can fall within Commerce Clause reach, but United States v. Lopez (1995) established outer limits for non-economic activity. The civil penalty structure, which assigns USDA the authority to assess penalties up to twice fair market value, may face scrutiny under the major questions doctrine (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022) and post-Loper Bright independent judicial review of agency authority, particularly if USDA issues implementing regulations that extend beyond the bill's explicit text.
Checks and balances
Congress would hold the core prohibition; the USDA Secretary gains enforcement and reporting authority; the Attorney General and state attorneys general gain concurrent civil enforcement power; federal district courts serve as the check on both agency penalty assessments and divestiture orders.
Historical precedent
More than 30 states have enacted some form of corporate farming or alien land ownership restriction, and several — including Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota — have faced constitutional challenges under the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause, with mixed results in federal courts.