S-4610-119
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 513.
Sponsored by Brian Schatz (D-HI)
What it does
The Pacific POWER Act would direct the Secretary of State, working with the Secretary of Energy, to establish an International Geothermal Program to promote geothermal energy development among U.S. allies and partners, with a priority focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The bill would require the State Department to assess global geothermal resources, select at least five partner countries (including at least three in the Indo-Pacific), and pursue memoranda of understanding or other agreements with those partners. It would also authorize the Secretary to coordinate grants, loans, loan guarantees, and other technical and financial assistance to partner countries and U.S. companies working with them, and would require regular strategy reports and annual progress updates to Congress.
Who benefits
U.S. geothermal energy companies, equipment manufacturers, and service providers who would gain access to new export markets and government-facilitated business connections. Indo-Pacific allies — including Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, India, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Thailand — that could reduce energy import dependence. U.S. national security interests broadly, if partner energy security reduces vulnerability to coercion. Workers in the U.S. geothermal sector who may see increased demand. U.S. financial institutions (Export-Import Bank, DFC, MCC) that would have new lending opportunities. Research institutions and national laboratories involved in next-generation geothermal technology. Indigenous and local communities in partner countries that the bill explicitly requires be engaged through free, prior, and informed consent processes.
Who is hurt
Competing energy exporters — including fossil fuel exporters — whose market share in the Indo-Pacific could shrink if geothermal displaces imported energy. China-linked energy companies and supply chain participants, which the bill explicitly aims to counter. U.S. taxpayers who would bear the cost of any appropriated funds, grants, or loan guarantees that do not generate returns. Other foreign policy or energy assistance priorities that could be deprioritized as State Department resources shift toward this program. Countries not selected as geothermal partners that may receive less U.S. energy engagement. Domestic U.S. energy programs that compete for the same agency personnel and budget resources.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Indo-Pacific allies face acute energy security vulnerabilities — Taiwan, for example, imports over 95% of its energy — making them susceptible to economic coercion and potentially increasing the likelihood of U.S. military involvement in a crisis. They contend that the United States leads the world in geothermal electricity generation and possesses the technology, expertise, and financing tools to help partners develop a dispatchable, domestically sourced energy supply, simultaneously opening export markets for U.S. companies and reducing partner reliance on adversary-controlled energy infrastructure. The bill's bipartisan sponsorship and committee advancement reflect broad agreement that energy diplomacy is a cost-effective tool for strengthening alliances without direct military expenditure.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill creates a new bureaucratic program with open-ended authorization ("such sums as necessary" in the original text) without clear metrics for success or mechanisms to ensure U.S. taxpayer funds are not wasted on projects that fail to reach commercial viability — a persistent challenge in geothermal development due to high upfront exploration costs and geological uncertainty. They contend that the State Department lacks the technical expertise to lead a complex energy development program, that the bill duplicates existing authorities at the DFC, Export-Import Bank, and USTDA, and that framing geothermal assistance as a national security tool may distort project selection toward politically convenient partners rather than those with the strongest technical and economic prospects.
Constitutional context
The bill operates squarely within Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and its power to appropriate funds. The Secretary of State's diplomatic engagement and agreement-making activities fall within the executive's recognized foreign affairs powers, though any binding international agreements beyond memoranda of understanding could implicate the Treaty Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2). The bill explicitly limits formal commitments to MOUs and "other appropriate agreements," which are generally treated as executive agreements not requiring Senate ratification.
Checks and balances
The executive branch — specifically the State Department — gains new programmatic authority and discretion to select partner countries and negotiate agreements; Congress retains oversight through mandatory reporting requirements, semi-annual briefings, and appropriations control, and the bill requires consultation with relevant congressional committees before partner selection.
Historical precedent
The Asia EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy) Initiative, launched in 2018, similarly directed U.S. agencies to promote energy security among Indo-Pacific partners through technical assistance and financing, providing a direct structural analogue to this program.