S-4644-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Adam Schiff (D-CA)
What it does
This bill would amend 31 U.S.C. § 1304 — the permanent, indefinite appropriation that funds court-ordered judgments against the federal government — to prohibit any payment from that fund for judgments, awards, compromise settlements, interest, or costs arising from lawsuits or claims filed by the President or Vice President. The restriction would apply retroactively to any pending case or cause of action arising on or after January 20, 2025.
Who benefits
Taxpayers who would be shielded from funding legal settlements or judgments won by the President or Vice President against the federal government. Congress, which would reassert control over a specific category of federal spending. Defendants in federal agencies who might otherwise face litigation costs from executive-branch-initiated suits. Parties in ongoing litigation who could use the restriction as a procedural defense.
Who is hurt
The sitting President and Vice President (and potentially future officeholders), who would lose access to a standard legal remedy available to all other citizens when suing the federal government. Any President or Vice President with a pending or future legitimate legal claim against the federal government — for example, a property dispute or contract claim — would be unable to collect a court-ordered judgment through this fund. Future Presidents and Vice Presidents of any party would be equally affected by the permanent statutory change.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Judgment Fund — a permanent, indefinitely appropriated account — was never intended to pay out awards to the very officials who lead the executive branch, creating an inherent conflict of interest and potential for self-dealing. They contend that allowing a President or Vice President to sue the federal government and collect taxpayer-funded settlements concentrates financial leverage in the executive branch in a way that undermines the separation of powers. They further argue the retroactive applicability to January 20, 2025 is necessary to close an existing loophole before it can be exploited.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill creates a two-tiered legal system by stripping the President and Vice President of a remedy available to every other American, potentially violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the government from depriving persons of property without due process. They contend the retroactive application to cases pending since January 20, 2025 raises serious constitutional concerns, as Congress generally cannot retroactively eliminate vested legal rights or court-ordered remedies. Critics may also argue the bill is narrowly targeted at specific officeholders rather than addressing a systemic structural problem, raising equal protection concerns.
Constitutional context
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is relevant because the bill would retroactively eliminate a payment mechanism for court-ordered judgments, potentially depriving individuals of a property interest without due process. The Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 18) gives Congress broad authority to set conditions on appropriations, including the Judgment Fund, but that authority is not unlimited when it singles out specific officeholders and applies retroactively to pending cases.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority to restrict a specific category of executive-branch spending from the Judgment Fund; the primary check is judicial review, as courts could assess whether the restriction violates the Due Process Clause or constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder by singling out specific officeholders.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously placed conditions and caps on Judgment Fund payments (e.g., the No FEAR Act of 2002 required agencies to reimburse the fund), but no prior statute has barred a specific class of federal officeholders from collecting court-ordered judgments from it.