S-4706-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Sponsored by Edward Markey (D-MA)
What it does
This bill would make two changes to federal anti-discrimination law. First, it would remove the existing caps on compensatory and punitive damages that victims of intentional discrimination (based on race, sex, religion, disability, and related categories) can recover under Title VII and related statutes, allowing unlimited recovery. Second, it would extend the full range of Title VII remedies — including compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials — to workers who bring age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which currently limits recovery to back pay and lost wages.
Who benefits
Workers who have experienced workplace discrimination based on sex, religion, disability, national origin, or age — particularly those with severe or long-lasting harm who currently hit the statutory damages cap. Older workers (age 40+) covered by the ADEA who would gain access to compensatory and punitive damages for the first time. Employment discrimination attorneys who work on contingency, as larger potential recoveries make more cases financially viable. Workers in large companies, where current caps ($300,000 for employers with 500+ employees) are most likely to be binding.
Who is hurt
Employers — particularly large corporations and institutions — who would face potentially unlimited financial exposure in discrimination lawsuits. Small businesses, which currently benefit from lower caps tied to employee count, would lose that tiered protection. Employers' liability insurers, who may face higher claims. Defendants in cases with sympathetic facts but modest actual harm, where juries could award large punitive damages. Employers in industries with older workforces (manufacturing, government contracting) who face heightened ADEA exposure.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current damages caps — set in 1991 and never adjusted for inflation — are arbitrary ceilings that allow large employers to treat discrimination as a manageable cost of doing business rather than a serious legal risk. They contend that race discrimination plaintiffs suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 already face no damages cap, creating an inequity where sex and disability discrimination victims receive lesser remedies for equally serious wrongs. They further argue that ADEA plaintiffs are uniquely disadvantaged compared to all other protected classes, and that equalizing remedies would deter discrimination more effectively.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that removing damages caps would expose employers — including small businesses and nonprofits — to unpredictable, potentially ruinous jury verdicts that bear no relationship to actual harm suffered. They contend that unlimited punitive damages in employment cases could chill legitimate personnel decisions, as employers may settle meritless claims rather than risk large jury awards, and that the existing tiered cap structure already scales liability to employer size. They further argue that the ADEA was deliberately structured differently from Title VII, reflecting Congress's considered judgment that age discrimination remedies should focus on wage restoration rather than punitive deterrence.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority to set remedies for employment discrimination under the Commerce Clause, as affirmed in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), and under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause is relevant to the bill's premise: the current disparity in remedies between race discrimination (uncapped under § 1981) and sex/disability/age discrimination raises questions about whether similarly situated victims are treated equally, though this is a statutory rather than constitutional inequality. No active constitutional tension is implicated by this bill's remedy-equalization mechanism.
Checks and balances
Congress would expand judicial remedies available to private plaintiffs; courts retain authority to review jury awards for excessiveness under due process standards, and employers may challenge punitive damage awards as unconstitutionally disproportionate under BMW of North America v. Gore (1996).
Historical precedent
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 originally established the current damages caps and extended jury trial rights under Title VII, representing the last major overhaul of employment discrimination remedies; prior to that act, Title VII plaintiffs could only recover equitable relief such as back pay.