S-5007-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
What it does
The SEARCH Act of 2026 would impose a set of behavioral and structural requirements on any online search platform used by at least 40% of Americans over age 12. It would prohibit the covered platform from paying for default search placement, self-preferencing its own products in results, or entering exclusive data-sharing agreements with publishers and distributors. It would require the platform to share its search index, user-side data, and advertising data with qualified competitors at marginal cost, and to license search results to competitors for at least 10 years. It would also require the platform to present users with a neutral "choice screen" at device setup and annually thereafter, and would sunset after 10 years unless Congress renews it.
Who benefits
Rival search engine companies (e.g., Bing, DuckDuckGo, and potential new entrants) that would gain access to data, search index content, and ad inventory currently controlled by the dominant platform. Advertisers who would gain greater transparency into auction mechanics and the ability to export campaign data. Publishers who could no longer be pressured to grant exclusive data rights as a condition of search indexing. Users who would receive a neutral choice screen and easier switching tools. State attorneys general who would gain new enforcement authority and standing to defend the law in court. AI search startups that would benefit from mandatory syndication of search results and ranking signals.
Who is hurt
The dominant covered platform — in practice, Google, which holds well above 40% U.S. search market share — would face significant restrictions on its existing business model, including the loss of default-placement revenue from device makers and browser developers. Device manufacturers (e.g., Apple, Samsung) and browser developers that currently receive revenue-sharing payments tied to default search status would lose that income stream. Employees of the covered platform required to complete mandatory annual antitrust training face personal civil penalties of up to 10% of total compensation for non-compliance. Advertisers in some cases may face reduced targeting precision if data-sharing requirements alter how user data is aggregated. Taxpayers and consumers could indirectly bear costs if compliance burdens are passed through to products or services.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the U.S. Department of Justice found in United States v. Google (2024) that Google illegally maintained its search monopoly in part through billions of dollars in default-placement payments — the exact conduct this bill targets. They contend that mandatory data sharing and syndication would lower the barriers to entry that have kept rivals from scaling, since a search engine's quality depends heavily on query volume data that only a dominant incumbent can accumulate. Supporters further argue that the choice screen requirement mirrors the European Union's Digital Markets Act, which produced measurable increases in rival search engine usage in the EU within months of implementation.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that forcing a company to share its search index, ranking signals, and user data at marginal cost amounts to a compelled subsidy of competitors, potentially chilling the covered platform's incentive to invest in the infrastructure that makes its search engine valuable in the first place. They contend that mandatory syndication and data-sharing obligations could raise First Amendment concerns under Moody v. NetChoice (2024), which recognized platforms' editorial discretion over how they curate and present content. Opponents also argue that the 40% user-share threshold effectively targets a single company by name, raising due process concerns about vagueness and the bill's use of regulatory power as a substitute for the judicial remedies already available under the Sherman Act.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to regulate online search markets rests on the Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), which grants broad power to regulate interstate commercial activity. The bill's mandatory data-sharing and syndication requirements may face First Amendment scrutiny under Moody v. NetChoice (2024), which held that platforms' editorial curation is protected speech, raising the question of whether compelling a search engine to share its ranking signals and index constitutes compelled speech. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts will independently assess whether the FTC's implementing rules stay within the statute's boundaries, without deferring to the agency's own interpretation.
Checks and balances
The legislative branch sets the substantive rules; the FTC gains significant new enforcement and rulemaking authority, including the power to approve acquisitions and levy penalties up to 15% of U.S. annual revenue; federal courts and state attorneys general serve as additional checks, with courts reviewing all FTC rules under the APA and the major questions doctrine post-Loper Bright.
Historical precedent
The European Union's Digital Markets Act (2022) imposed similar default-placement, data-sharing, and choice-screen obligations on designated "gatekeepers," and the U.S. Department of Justice's antitrust case United States v. Google (2024) found that Google's default-placement payments violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act — the same conduct this bill would prohibit by statute.