S-5025-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Sponsored by Darline Graham (R-SC)
What it does
This bill would impose a sweeping package of economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and financial prohibitions on Russia, its government officials, affiliated entities, and third-party countries that continue purchasing Russian energy. It would block the U.S.-held assets of named Russian banks and officials, ban U.S. persons from investing in or trading with Russia, prohibit Russian securities on U.S. exchanges, ban imports of Russian uranium, raise tariffs on Russian goods by up to 500%, and impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries that are among the top buyers of Russian oil and gas or that help Russia evade existing sanctions. The President would be required to review and update the sanctions list every 180 days, with limited waiver authority and humanitarian exceptions.
Who benefits
Ukraine and its government, which would benefit from reduced Russian military and economic capacity. U.S. and allied defense and energy industries that compete with Russian exports. Countries and companies that have already reduced Russian energy dependence and would face less competitive pressure. Victims of Russian human rights abuses and cyberattacks. U.S. uranium producers who would gain market share as Russian uranium imports are banned. Allied governments (EU, UK, G7) whose existing sanctions regimes would be reinforced and harder to evade. U.S. financial institutions not exposed to Russian markets. Humanitarian organizations, which are explicitly exempted from the sanctions.
Who is hurt
U.S. companies with existing operations or investments in Russia, which would face a 270-day wind-down window before full compliance is required. U.S. nuclear power plant operators that currently rely on Russian-origin low-enriched uranium and may face supply disruptions or higher costs. Third-country importers of Russian energy — potentially including India, China, Turkey, and others — whose goods could face up to 100% U.S. tariffs, raising costs for U.S. importers of those countries' products. American consumers and businesses that import goods from tariff-targeted countries, who could face higher prices. Russian citizens broadly, including those not affiliated with the government, who may experience economic hardship from financial isolation. Small and mid-sized U.S. financial institutions with indirect exposure to sanctioned entities. Countries with limited alternative energy sources that depend on Russian natural gas and could face tariffs despite constrained options.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Russia's ongoing military campaign in Ukraine — including missile strikes on civilian infrastructure, forced deportation of children, and documented war crimes — demands a comprehensive economic response that goes beyond existing piecemeal measures. They contend that the current sanctions regime has been undermined by a "shadow fleet" of vessels and third-country intermediaries that allow Russia to continue earning energy revenues funding its military, and that secondary tariffs of up to 100% on complicit countries are necessary to close those evasion pathways. With 72 bipartisan Senate co-sponsors, supporters argue the bill reflects broad consensus that stronger economic pressure is the most effective non-military tool to compel a negotiated end to the conflict.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that imposing secondary tariffs of up to 100% on major trading partners — potentially including India, China, and Turkey — could trigger retaliatory trade measures, fracture diplomatic coalitions, and harm U.S. exporters and consumers far more than Russia itself. They contend that mandatory, congressionally-directed sanctions with limited presidential waiver authority dangerously constrain executive flexibility in active diplomacy, potentially undermining ongoing peace negotiations by removing economic leverage the President could otherwise deploy. Critics also argue that banning U.S. uranium imports from Russia without adequate domestic supply alternatives could destabilize the U.S. nuclear energy sector, which relies on Russian-origin fuel for a significant share of its reactor needs.