S-5063-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Sponsored by Ted Budd (R-NC)
What it does
This bill would formally establish within the Department of State a program called the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program. The program would be managed by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and would conduct diplomacy, provide technical consultation, and offer early-stage commercial development support to help partner countries adopt U.S.-sourced civil nuclear energy technology, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs). The bill also requires a report and annual briefings to Congress on program activities and spending, and the program would automatically terminate on June 8, 2034.
Who benefits
U.S. civil nuclear energy companies and their suppliers, who would gain diplomatic backing and market access support in foreign markets. U.S. workers in the nuclear manufacturing and engineering sectors. Partner countries seeking to expand clean energy capacity with safety and nonproliferation guardrails. U.S. national security interests, to the extent that U.S.-standard nuclear infrastructure displaces alternatives from state-backed foreign competitors. Nonproliferation advocates who favor high-standard nuclear deployment frameworks globally.
Who is hurt
Foreign state-backed nuclear energy exporters (notably Russia's Rosatom and China's CGNPC) that compete with U.S. companies for the same international contracts and may lose market share. Countries that prefer lower-cost or less-regulated nuclear partnerships and may find U.S. standards burdensome. U.S. taxpayers who fund the program's diplomatic and technical assistance activities. Renewable energy companies that compete with nuclear energy for the same international clean energy financing and policy attention.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Russia and China have aggressively expanded their state-subsidized nuclear export programs — Rosatom alone has contracts in over 30 countries — and that without a coordinated U.S. diplomatic and commercial strategy, American companies cannot compete on equal footing. They contend that U.S.-standard SMR deployment advances both economic interests and global nonproliferation goals, since U.S. nuclear agreements (known as 123 Agreements) require partner countries to meet the highest safeguards standards, reducing the risk of weapons proliferation compared to alternatives.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the FIRST program amounts to government-directed industrial policy that uses diplomatic resources to subsidize private nuclear companies, raising questions about whether taxpayer-funded support unfairly advantages specific firms. They contend that SMR technology remains largely unproven at commercial scale — as of 2026, very few SMR designs have received full regulatory approval — meaning the program may promote technology that is not yet ready for international deployment, potentially exposing partner countries and U.S. credibility to risk if projects stall or fail.
Constitutional context
The bill operates squarely within Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and the executive branch's broad foreign affairs powers. No significant constitutional tension exists: Congress is directing a State Department program, which falls within its appropriations and oversight authority, while the executive retains discretion over diplomatic engagement under the Commander-in-Chief and Reception Clauses.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (specifically the State Department's Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security) gains a formal programmatic mandate, but Congress retains oversight through required reports and annual briefings to the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations committees, and the program automatically sunsets in 2034 unless reauthorized.
Historical precedent
The original FIRST program was launched administratively by the State Department in 2020; this bill would codify and formalize that existing program in statute, similar to how Congress has previously codified other executive-branch trade and export promotion initiatives.