S-5148-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Eric Schmitt (R-MO)
What it does
This bill would require all federal district courts and courts of appeals to assign civil cases to judges through a strictly randomized process, prohibiting any party, attorney, or judge — including chief judges — from selecting or influencing assignments. It would also require automatic reassignment of a case to a new randomly selected judge whenever the Supreme Court reverses, vacates, or overrides a district court's ruling in that case. All courts would be required to publicly disclose their assignment rules and publish annual statistical reports on reassignments.
Who benefits
Litigants in federal civil cases who believe they are disadvantaged by predictable judge assignments, particularly those challenging government actions in jurisdictions with few judges. Civil rights plaintiffs and defendants who seek neutral forums. The general public, which would gain access to annual transparency reports on how cases are assigned. Litigants in multi-judge districts who currently face uncertainty about whether assignments are truly random. Federal judges who are currently subject to pressure or suspicion regarding case assignments.
Who is hurt
Litigants — including advocacy groups, states, and corporations — who currently benefit from filing in single-judge divisions where a favorable judge is guaranteed. Attorneys whose litigation strategies rely on predictable judge assignments. Chief judges who would lose discretionary authority over case assignments. Federal courts as institutions, which would face administrative costs and a 120-day implementation deadline to overhaul existing assignment systems. District judges who are reversed by the Supreme Court would face mandatory reassignment, which critics may view as a reputational consequence.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that "judge shopping" — the practice of filing cases in single-judge divisions to guarantee a favorable judge — has become a documented litigation strategy that undermines public confidence in the federal judiciary. They contend that high-profile cases involving nationwide injunctions have been filed in specific divisions precisely because only one judge presides there, making the outcome of assignment predictable. Supporters further argue that the automatic reassignment provision after Supreme Court reversals prevents a single judge from repeatedly issuing orders that the Court has already found erroneous, protecting the integrity of the judicial process.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that mandatory reassignment after a Supreme Court reversal effectively punishes judges for good-faith legal disagreements with a higher court, conflating legal error — which is a normal part of appellate review — with judicial misconduct or bias. They contend that the bill's 120-day implementation deadline is operationally unrealistic for courts with complex existing docket management systems, and that stripping chief judges of assignment discretion could impair the efficient administration of justice in emergencies. Opponents also argue that Congress legislating the internal case-assignment procedures of Article III courts raises separation of powers concerns about congressional interference with judicial administration.