S-5163-119
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
Sponsored by Josh Hawley (R-MO)
What it does
This bill would amend federal law to prohibit the U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors from awarding any bonus, award, or extra monetary compensation — beyond base salary — to the Postmaster General or Deputy Postmaster General in any fiscal year where USPS fails to achieve at least 95% on-time delivery performance across every market-dominant product category (such as First-Class Mail). It would also require USPS to submit its annual performance report to the Postal Regulatory Commission, adding a layer of regulatory oversight.
Who benefits
Residential and business mail recipients who depend on reliable delivery of First-Class Mail, periodicals, and other market-dominant products. Small businesses that rely on predictable mail delivery for invoices, payments, and marketing. Taxpayers and postal ratepayers who fund USPS operations and have an interest in executive accountability. The Postal Regulatory Commission, which would gain access to performance reports it did not previously receive directly. Members of Congress seeking oversight leverage over USPS leadership.
Who is hurt
The Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General, who could lose significant compensation even if delivery failures stem from factors outside their direct control (e.g., natural disasters, supply chain disruptions, or inherited infrastructure problems). USPS senior leadership more broadly, if the precedent extends to other executives. Potentially, USPS's ability to recruit and retain top executive talent if compensation becomes more constrained relative to comparable private-sector roles.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that USPS on-time delivery rates have fallen well below the 95% threshold in recent years — First-Class Mail performance dropped to around 87% in some reporting periods — while top executives continued to receive bonuses, creating a disconnect between pay and performance. They contend that tying executive compensation directly to measurable service outcomes is a basic accountability standard applied routinely in the private sector, and that taxpayers and ratepayers should not subsidize bonuses when the core mission of timely mail delivery is not being met.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a rigid, all-or-nothing bonus prohibition tied to a single 95% threshold across every product category could penalize executives for delivery failures caused by factors beyond their control, such as extreme weather, pandemic-related disruptions, or decades of deferred infrastructure investment. They contend that eliminating performance-based pay entirely in bad years may actually weaken the incentive structure needed to attract and retain qualified leadership, and that more flexible, graduated compensation metrics would better align executive behavior with long-term service improvement.
Constitutional context
No significant constitutional issue is raised by this bill. Congress has broad authority to set the terms of compensation for officers of federal entities like USPS under Article I and its power to structure government corporations. No active constitutional tension area is implicated.
Checks and balances
Congress gains direct statutory control over USPS executive compensation conditions; the Board of Governors retains authority to set base pay but loses discretion over bonuses in underperforming years; the Postal Regulatory Commission gains a new reporting requirement that strengthens its oversight role.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously legislated USPS executive compensation conditions through the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, which restructured USPS governance and compensation frameworks, though no prior law has tied bonuses specifically to on-time delivery thresholds.