S-5572-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Sponsored by Eric Schmitt (R-MO)
What it does
The bill would appropriate about $30.1 billion for fiscal year 2027, available until spent. It would fund a pilot program of grants (federal share up to 90 percent) for up to 3 aging medium hub airport terminals ($10 billion), air traffic control modernization ($10.1 billion), and terminal air traffic control facilities and discretionary airport grants ($10 billion). It would also let the FAA Administrator move money between categories in Public Law 119-21 section 40003(a) and among the Sec. 4 categories, and would require periodic reports to Congress.
Who benefits
Sponsors of up to 3 qualifying medium hub airports that would receive terminal rebuilding grants. Airports of all sizes that could compete for discretionary terminal and improvement grants, with small and nonhub airports facing a lower 5 percent local share. Air travelers, airlines, and new-entrant carriers who may see less congestion and more competition. Technology and construction contractors who would win FAA and airport work. Cargo operators at airports that expand handling capacity. Air traffic controllers who would use upgraded workstations and facilities.
Who is hurt
Federal taxpayers, because the bill would add about $30 billion in spending drawn from the Treasury without offsets stated in the text. Medium hub airports that do not meet the pilot's narrow criteria and would be excluded from the $10 billion set-aside. Airports that rely on formula apportionments, since $3 billion would bypass apportionment formulas and could favor projects chosen at the Secretary's discretion. Competing transportation priorities, such as rail, highways, and transit, that would compete for the same federal funds. Congressional appropriators, whose oversight could be reduced by broad transfer authority and multi-year funding.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that aging terminals and outdated air traffic control systems create delays, safety risks, and competitive disadvantages, and that a one-time infusion of about $30 billion would speed modernization already in planning. They contend the pilot's requirements for completed environmental review and final design show readiness, and that the reporting requirements and capped administrative expenses keep spending accountable. They add that flexible transfer authority lets the FAA direct money to the most urgent technology needs.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that adding about $30 billion in new spending without offsets raises deficits, and that selecting up to 3 airports at the Secretary's sole discretion invites favoritism and gives few airports a large benefit. They contend that bypassing apportionment formulas, allowing transfers among categories, and making funds available until spent weakens congressional control and oversight. They add that the FAA has faced past cost and schedule problems on large technology programs, which makes large lump-sum funding risky.
Constitutional context
Congress funds airports and air traffic control under its Spending Clause and Commerce Clause powers (Art. I, §8), and the Appropriations Clause (Art. I, §9, cl. 7) governs the direct appropriations. Grant conditions are generally upheld if they are clear and related to the program's purpose (South Dakota v. Dole, 1987); the bill raises no unusual constitutional question beyond the breadth of the discretion delegated to the Secretary.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (DOT and FAA) gains substantial discretion over grant selection and fund transfers, while Congress retains checks through the committee briefing and quarterly reporting requirements, future appropriations, and its oversight authority.
Historical precedent
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (2021) created the Airport Terminal Program and funded air traffic facilities, and Public Law 119-21 (2025) funded air traffic control upgrades, both of which this bill builds on.