S-940-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Sponsored by John Kennedy (R-LA)
What it does
The bill would require the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC, in consultation with the Treasury Secretary, to jointly send Congress a report each year by January 31 on the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and post it on the Board's website. The report would cover who will attend meetings, the problems and options to be considered, the standards that could affect the United States, the legal authority relied on, and subcommittee activities. Within 30 days of any significant change in planned activities, they would have to inform Congress of meeting results, minutes summaries, votes or positions, proposals, and each U.S. representative's position. The Fed's Chair and Vice Chair for Supervision would have to include the report's details in their annual testimony to the Senate Banking and House Financial Services Committees.
Who benefits
Members and staff of the Senate Banking and House Financial Services Committees, who would receive advance and follow-up information on international bank standards. Banks, trade groups, and other businesses that could use the public report to anticipate rules affecting them. Researchers, journalists, and members of the public who want to follow U.S. positions in international bank standard-setting.
Who is hurt
Staff at the Federal Reserve, New York Fed, OCC, and FDIC who would bear added reporting and coordination work. U.S. regulators who may find that publishing goals, options, and positions before and after meetings limits their room for candid or flexible negotiation with foreign counterparts. Other Basel members could be affected if confidential deliberations become public, which may change how they share information.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Basel standards often shape U.S. capital rules, yet the public and Congress learn about U.S. negotiating positions only after the fact. They contend that requiring advance goals, meeting results, and each representative's position would strengthen congressional oversight of unelected regulators and give affected businesses earlier notice of proposed rules.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that international bank standard-setting depends on candid, confidential discussion, and that publishing U.S. goals, options, and each representative's position could weaken the negotiating leverage of American regulators. They contend that regulators already testify before Congress and that the added deadlines and reports would create administrative burden without clear benefit.
Constitutional context
Congress's oversight and information-gathering power, implied from Article I legislative authority and recognized in McGrain v. Daugherty (1927), supports reporting requirements on executive agencies. The bill could raise questions about the President's foreign affairs and negotiation role under Article II, though it mandates disclosure and does not restrict negotiating positions.
Checks and balances
Congress gains information and oversight leverage over the Fed, OCC, FDIC, and Treasury, while the executive-branch and independent regulators lose some confidentiality in international negotiations; the bill creates no enforcement penalty.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously required agency reporting and testimony on financial regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements for regular Fed testimony and reports, though not specifically on Basel Committee deliberations.