S-97-115
Became Public Law No: 115-248.
Sponsored by Mike Crapo (R-ID)
What it does
This law directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to expand its civilian nuclear research infrastructure by establishing a fast neutron research facility, launching a high-performance computing program for reactor modeling, and creating a cost-share grant program to help private companies cover Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing fees. It also authorizes DOE to host and oversee privately funded experimental advanced nuclear reactors at national laboratories, requires DOE to submit 10-year budget plans for nuclear research to Congress, and mandates coordination agreements between DOE and the NRC to share technical expertise on advanced reactor development and safety review.
Who benefits
Private nuclear energy companies and startups seeking to develop and license advanced reactor designs; university and private-sector researchers who would gain access to new national laboratory facilities; national laboratories (especially Idaho National Laboratory) that would receive expanded missions and resources; the NRC, which would gain access to DOE technical expertise and facilities; fusion energy researchers who could benefit from a new DOE innovation initiative; and small nuclear technology firms that would receive cost-share grants to offset NRC licensing fees.
Who is hurt
Competing energy industries (natural gas, wind, solar) that may face a better-funded nuclear competitor; taxpayers who fund DOE programs if the unconstrained budget option is pursued; communities near national laboratories or DOE-owned sites where experimental reactors could be built, who bear proximity risk; and existing nuclear operators whose market position could be disrupted by new advanced reactor entrants supported by public resources.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States risks falling behind China, Russia, and other nations that are aggressively developing advanced nuclear reactor technology, and that this law provides the research infrastructure needed to keep American nuclear innovation competitive. They contend that nuclear energy produces large amounts of carbon-free electricity, making it a critical tool for addressing climate change, and that the cost-share grant program removes a significant financial barrier that has historically prevented smaller companies from even beginning the NRC licensing process. Supporters also argue that by enabling private-sector investment in experimental reactors at national laboratories, the law leverages public assets without requiring the government to bear the full cost of development, and that the mandatory 10-year budget plans will bring long-overdue planning discipline to DOE's nuclear research programs.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that directing DOE resources and national laboratory infrastructure toward private nuclear ventures amounts to a government subsidy for an industry that has struggled commercially for decades, and that the market has already signaled skepticism about advanced nuclear's economic viability. They contend that hosting privately funded experimental reactors at federal sites exposes taxpayers to financial and safety liability — particularly through the Price-Anderson Act indemnification provisions — without guaranteed public benefit. Critics also argue that the law's broad delegation of authority to DOE to authorize and oversee experimental reactors lacks sufficient safety and environmental review requirements, and that the same funding and infrastructure could produce greater near-term carbon reductions if directed toward already-proven renewable energy technologies.
Constitutional context
The law rests primarily on Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, Sec. 8) to regulate energy markets and fund federal research programs, as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause to establish supporting agencies and programs. The DOE–NRC coordination memoranda and the delegation of authority to DOE to authorize experimental reactors raise Nondelegation Clause considerations, particularly in light of West Virginia v. EPA (2022), which requires clear congressional authorization for agency actions of major economic or policy significance. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts would independently review DOE and NRC interpretations of their statutory authority rather than deferring to agency readings. The Price-Anderson Act indemnification provisions implicate the Takings Clause if private reactor incidents cause property damage. Sackett v. EPA (2023) is less directly relevant but reflects the Court's current tendency to read agency jurisdiction narrowly.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (DOE) gains significant new authority to host, authorize, and oversee privately funded experimental reactors on federal property, and to enter binding memoranda of understanding with the NRC — an independent regulatory agency. Congress retains oversight through the mandatory 10-year budget submissions and the requirement that DOE report on fusion energy designs and costs. The NRC's independent regulatory role is preserved in licensing decisions, but its coordination with DOE under the memoranda could blur the line between the agency that promotes nuclear energy (DOE) and the agency that regulates it (NRC), a separation that has been a structural feature of U.S. nuclear governance since 1974.
Historical precedent
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 similarly directed DOE to support nuclear energy research and public-private partnerships, including loan guarantees for new reactor construction. The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 established the foundational framework for federal promotion and regulation of civilian nuclear power, including the separation of promotional and regulatory functions that this law's DOE–NRC coordination provisions touch upon.