SJRES-21-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Sponsored by Bernard Sanders (I-VT)
What it does
This joint resolution would prohibit a specific proposed foreign military sale to Israel that was formally notified to Congress on February 10, 2025. The sale includes approximately 2,166 small diameter bombs, 2,800 general-purpose 500-pound bomb bodies, over 17,000 precision guidance kits (JDAMs) for various bomb bodies, over 17,000 fuzes, and related support equipment and logistics. If enacted, the sale described in Transmittal No. 24-13 under the Arms Export Control Act would be blocked.
Who benefits
Advocates for Palestinian civilians in Gaza who argue U.S.-supplied munitions have contributed to civilian casualties. Human rights organizations that have called for arms restrictions. Members of Congress seeking to reassert legislative authority over arms sales. Countries and international bodies that have urged the U.S. to condition military aid to Israel. U.S. defense contractors' competitors in other countries who might fill any resulting supply gap.
Who is hurt
Israel's military, which would lose access to a specific package of precision-guided and general-purpose munitions. U.S. defense manufacturers — including Boeing (JDAM kits) and other suppliers — who would lose the contracted sale revenue. The broader U.S.-Israel defense relationship, which some analysts argue depends on consistent arms supply commitments. U.S. diplomatic credibility with other arms-purchasing allies who may view the disapproval as a signal of unreliable supply. Workers employed in the production of the affected munitions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the munitions in this sale — including large general-purpose bombs and thousands of precision guidance kits — have been linked by independent investigators and UN agencies to strikes resulting in significant civilian casualties in Gaza. They contend that Congress has both the legal authority under the Arms Export Control Act and a moral obligation to review and block arms transfers that may contribute to violations of international humanitarian law, and that this resolution is a direct exercise of the congressional oversight role built into the AECA's notification process.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that blocking this sale would undermine a cornerstone U.S. security commitment to Israel, a treaty-level ally, at a moment of active regional conflict, potentially degrading Israel's ability to conduct precision strikes and increasing reliance on less accurate munitions. They contend that the Arms Export Control Act's notification process was designed to inform Congress, not to routinely override executive foreign policy judgments, and that disapproval resolutions of this kind set a precedent that could destabilize U.S. arms relationships with allies worldwide who depend on supply reliability.
Constitutional context
The Arms Export Control Act's Section 36(b) notification process reflects the constitutional tension between Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and the President's broad foreign policy and Commander-in-Chief powers (Art. II). Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) affirmed that the President holds significant exclusive authority in foreign affairs, though arms sales approvals have long been structured as a shared power requiring congressional notification and subject to legislative disapproval.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain the authority to block this specific executive-branch-approved arms transfer; the check on that authority is that the joint resolution must pass both chambers and survive a potential presidential veto, requiring a two-thirds override majority if vetoed.
Historical precedent
Congress has used the Arms Export Control Act's disapproval mechanism before — most notably in 1986 when the Senate passed a resolution disapproving a Saudi Arabia arms sale — though such resolutions have rarely become law due to presidential vetoes and the difficulty of achieving veto-proof majorities.