SJRES-219-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Ashley Moody (R-FL)
What it does
This joint resolution would propose a constitutional amendment, which takes effect only if three-fourths of the states ratify it, and then 2 years after ratification. It would require Congress to enact budgets where outlays do not exceed receipts, based on the average of the previous 3 years of revenue. It would also require a biannual appropriations process, itemization of large appropriations, 72 hours of public text before votes, a budget stabilization fund (1% of prior-year net revenue, growing to at least 10% by the tenth year), a debt commission meeting every 10 years while debt exceeds 60% of GDP, a 2-year presidential budget, and a presidential line-item veto of appropriation provisions when projected outlays exceed projected revenues, which Congress could override by a three-fourths vote of each House.
Who benefits
Taxpayers and bond holders who may favor lower long-term deficits and debt. Members of Congress and the public who want advance access to spending bill text and itemized large appropriations. Future federal budgets, which would gain a reserve fund for revenue shortfalls and emergencies. Presidents, who would gain line-item veto power and a formal budgeting role.
Who is hurt
Recipients of federal programs, including Social Security, Medicare, and defense contractors, who may face cuts or tax increases if budgets must balance, especially in recessions. Members of Congress, who would lose spending flexibility and some power relative to the President. States and localities that rely on federal grants. Workers and businesses that may be affected if balancing rules deepen downturns by requiring spending cuts or tax increases when revenue falls.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that annual deficits and a national debt well above 60 percent of GDP show that ordinary statutes have failed to restrain borrowing, and that a constitutional rule is the durable fix. They contend that the three-year average revenue baseline, the reserve fund, the 72-hour reading period, and the line-item veto add discipline and transparency while leaving room for emergencies through the stabilization fund.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a fixed balance requirement could force spending cuts or tax increases during recessions, when federal deficits typically cushion the economy, and that the reserve fund could prove too small. They contend that the line-item veto shifts spending power from Congress to the President, and that the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. City of New York (1998) struck down a statutory version, leaving the amendment's enforcement vague.
Constitutional context
Article V governs this proposal, requiring two-thirds of each House and ratification by three-fourths of the states; the President has no formal role in it. The line-item veto would reverse Clinton v. City of New York (1998), which held that a statutory line-item veto violated the Presentment Clause (Art. I, §7), and it would alter Congress's Article I, §9 power of the purse.
Checks and balances
The President would gain line-item veto and budget-planning authority, while Congress would lose some spending discretion but keep a three-fourths override and enforcement power; courts' role in enforcing the balance requirement is unclear.
Historical precedent
Congress has considered balanced budget amendments repeatedly, and the House passed one in 1995 that failed in the Senate by one vote. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was struck down in Clinton v. City of New York (1998).