SRES-111-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S1584)
Sponsored by Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)
What it does
This resolution would formally express the Senate's condemnation of the Russian Armed Forces and Russian government officials for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in Ukraine. It cites two specific findings: a February 2023 U.S. Department of State determination and a September 2022 United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry conclusion. As a simple Senate resolution, it would carry no binding legal force, impose no sanctions, and appropriate no funds.
Who benefits
Ukrainian civilians and government, who would receive a formal symbolic statement of U.S. Senate support. International human rights organizations and war crimes prosecutors who may use the resolution to bolster political pressure for accountability. U.S. allies in NATO and Eastern Europe who favor strong rhetorical alignment against Russia. Advocates for international humanitarian law who argue that legislative condemnations reinforce global norms.
Who is hurt
U.S. diplomatic efforts that depend on maintaining negotiating flexibility with Russia could be complicated by a formal condemnation. American businesses or individuals with Russian commercial ties may face indirect reputational or political pressure. Advocates for a negotiated peace settlement who argue that strong condemnatory language could harden positions and reduce the likelihood of ceasefire talks.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the resolution simply affirms findings already made by the U.S. State Department and a UN-mandated commission — both of which concluded that Russian forces committed war crimes in Ukraine. They contend that the Senate has a responsibility to go on record endorsing its own government's official determinations, and that formal condemnation reinforces international accountability norms and signals bipartisan resolve to U.S. allies at a critical moment in the conflict.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a formal condemnation resolution, while non-binding, could constrain diplomatic flexibility at a sensitive moment when ceasefire negotiations may be possible, potentially hardening Russian positions. They contend that symbolic resolutions without accompanying policy mechanisms — such as sanctions or aid — do little to change conditions on the ground, and that congressional energy would be better directed toward substantive legislative action rather than non-enforceable statements.