SRES-114-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S1584)
Sponsored by Michael Bennet (D-CO)
What it does
This resolution would express the formal sense of the Senate that Russia started the war against Ukraine by launching a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and occupation of parts of the Donbas region in 2014. It is a "sense of the Senate" resolution, meaning it carries no binding legal force, creates no new law, appropriates no funds, and imposes no obligations on any party. It would serve as a formal statement of the Senate's collective position on the origin and responsibility for the conflict.
Who benefits
The Ukrainian government and its diplomatic representatives, who would gain a formal U.S. Senate endorsement of their account of the war's origins. U.S. allies and NATO partners who share this characterization of the conflict. Advocates for continued U.S. support of Ukraine, who could cite the resolution in policy debates. Senators who wish to signal a position on the conflict without committing to specific legislative action.
Who is hurt
The Russian government, whose preferred narrative about the conflict's origins would be formally contradicted by the U.S. Senate. U.S. diplomatic efforts that rely on ambiguity or neutrality in characterizing the conflict's origins, which could be complicated by a formal Senate declaration. Senators or officials engaged in ceasefire or negotiation efforts who may view a one-sided declaration as an obstacle to diplomacy.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the February 24, 2022 invasion was a clear and documented act of military aggression against a sovereign nation, recognized as such by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution ES-11/1, which passed 141-5. They contend that the Senate has a responsibility to formally state the historical record — including Russia's prior annexation of Crimea in 2014 — to counter disinformation, reinforce U.S. commitments to international law, and provide a clear foundation for ongoing foreign policy decisions regarding Ukraine.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a non-binding resolution assigning sole blame to Russia for starting the war oversimplifies a conflict with a complex geopolitical history, including NATO expansion, the 2014 Maidan uprising, and prior hostilities in eastern Ukraine — and that such a declaration could harden positions and undermine ongoing diplomatic or ceasefire negotiations. They contend that the Senate's role is to legislate, not to issue one-sided historical verdicts, and that this resolution could constrain the executive branch's flexibility in conducting foreign policy, which the Constitution primarily assigns to the President.
Constitutional context
The Constitution assigns the President exclusive authority over foreign policy recognition and diplomacy under the Reception Clause (Art. II, §3), as affirmed in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015). A non-binding sense-of-the-Senate resolution does not carry the force of law and therefore does not directly conflict with executive foreign policy powers, but it does represent Congress exercising its advisory and expressive role in foreign affairs.
Checks and balances
The Senate expresses a collective political position; because the resolution is non-binding, no branch gains or loses formal legal authority, and the executive retains full discretion over diplomatic conduct and foreign policy.
Historical precedent
The Senate has passed numerous sense-of-the-Senate resolutions on foreign conflicts, including resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, though those were paired with binding authorizations for military force.