SRES-672-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S1787-1788)
Sponsored by Mike Lee (R-UT)
What it does
This resolution would express the sense of the Senate that the United States should prioritize bilateral (one-on-one) security agreements with individual countries over multilateral security agreements and institutions such as NATO, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization. It would call on the U.S. to use its power to attract smaller nations as bilateral partners and to withdraw support from multilateral institutions deemed contrary to U.S. interests. As a "sense of Congress" resolution, it would carry no binding legal force and would not change any existing law, treaty, or funding level.
Who benefits
Countries that could negotiate favorable one-on-one security deals with the U.S. and gain direct American military or diplomatic backing. U.S. defense contractors and industries that may benefit from bilateral arms and security agreements tailored to specific partners. Policymakers and officials who favor a more transactional, leverage-based approach to foreign policy. Taxpayers, to the extent reduced multilateral financial contributions lower U.S. costs — though this resolution does not itself change any funding.
Who is hurt
Smaller and medium-sized nations that rely on multilateral institutions for collective security guarantees they could not obtain in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. NATO member states and other multilateral alliance partners whose relationships with the U.S. could be deprioritized. International organizations such as the UN and WHO, which could face reduced U.S. engagement or funding pressure. U.S. diplomatic and military personnel whose work is structured around multilateral frameworks. Populations in conflict zones where multilateral peacekeeping or humanitarian coordination provides security that bilateral arrangements may not replicate.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the U.S. contributes disproportionately to multilateral institutions — historically nearly one-third of the UN budget and more than twice NATO allies' combined defense spending — while receiving voting power equal to every other member state, a structural imbalance that undermines American leverage. They contend that bilateral agreements allow the U.S. to negotiate terms tailored to each partner's capabilities and culture, are easier to amend as security conditions change, and prevent adversaries such as China from diluting U.S. influence through multilateral bodies. They point to the WHO's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the UN's exclusion of Taiwan as concrete examples of multilateral institutions failing to serve U.S. interests.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that multilateral alliances like NATO have delivered collective defense outcomes — including deterring large-scale conflict in Europe for over 75 years — that no series of bilateral agreements could replicate at equivalent cost, since burden-sharing and mutual defense commitments multiply U.S. deterrent power. They contend that signaling a preference for bilateral arrangements could fracture existing alliances, encourage adversaries to exploit divisions among U.S. partners, and leave smaller allies vulnerable to coercion by regional powers. They further argue that the resolution's characterization of multilateral institutions as failures selectively omits cases where coordinated multilateral action — such as sanctions coalitions — has advanced U.S. security goals more effectively than unilateral or bilateral approaches.
Constitutional context
The Treaty Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 2) gives the President power to make treaties with Senate approval, and the Reception Clause (Art. II, §3) grants the President exclusive recognition power over foreign governments. Because this is a non-binding sense-of-Congress resolution, it does not alter treaty obligations or direct executive action, so no direct constitutional conflict arises. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) affirmed that the President holds exclusive recognition power, underscoring that Congress cannot compel changes to foreign policy through non-binding resolutions.
Checks and balances
This resolution does not shift legal authority between branches; the executive branch retains full discretion over foreign policy, and the resolution's expression of congressional preference carries no enforceable weight on the President's conduct of diplomacy or treaty-making.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously passed non-binding resolutions expressing preferences on alliance policy, including resolutions affirming NATO commitments (e.g., S. Res. 150, 118th Congress), but no directly analogous resolution formally urging a structural shift from multilateral to bilateral security frameworks has been enacted.