SRES-754-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S2448)
Sponsored by Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)
What it does
This resolution would formally reaffirm the Senate's support for the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances as the foundational pillars of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. It would express the Senate's continued backing for Taiwan's self-defense and opposition to any non-peaceful resolution of Taiwan's political status. As a simple Senate resolution, it would not create new law, appropriate funds, or impose binding legal obligations on any party.
Who benefits
Taiwan's government and people, who would receive a public signal of continued U.S. congressional commitment to their security and self-determination. U.S. defense contractors that supply Taiwan with arms under the TRA, whose business relationships would be reaffirmed. U.S. businesses with commercial ties to Taiwan, who benefit from the stability that the TRA framework provides. Allies in the Indo-Pacific region (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) who rely on U.S. credibility in the region. Bipartisan foreign policy advocates who support the existing One China Policy framework.
Who is hurt
The People's Republic of China, which opposes any U.S. affirmation of support for Taiwan's separate status and self-defense. U.S. businesses with significant operations in mainland China, who may face diplomatic or economic blowback from Beijing in response to the resolution. Advocates for a more accommodating U.S. posture toward China who argue that such resolutions unnecessarily provoke tensions. Diplomatic efforts seeking to reduce U.S.-China friction, which could be complicated by the resolution's public reaffirmation of arms sales and opposition to coercion.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Taiwan Relations Act has successfully preserved peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for over four decades, and that periodic congressional reaffirmation is essential to deter aggression — particularly as China's military capabilities and assertiveness have grown. They contend that the resolution reinforces a bipartisan consensus stretching back to 1979, signals to Beijing that any coercive action would face unified U.S. opposition, and reassures Taiwan and regional allies of U.S. reliability at a moment of heightened geopolitical uncertainty.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a formal Senate reaffirmation of arms sales and opposition to coercion unnecessarily inflames U.S.-China relations at a sensitive moment, potentially accelerating the very military buildup and confrontation it seeks to deter. They contend that the resolution's explicit endorsement of the Six Assurances — particularly the commitment not to pressure Taiwan into negotiations — forecloses diplomatic flexibility and may harden positions on both sides of the strait, making a peaceful resolution less, not more, likely.
Constitutional context
The Taiwan Relations Act itself navigates the tension between the President's exclusive recognition power (Art. II, §3) — affirmed in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) — and Congress's authority over foreign commerce (Art. I, §8, cl. 3) and arms sales. This resolution does not alter that balance but reaffirms Congress's longstanding role in shaping the statutory framework governing U.S.-Taiwan relations, an area where the two branches have historically shared overlapping authority.
Checks and balances
Congress expresses its collective position through this non-binding resolution; the executive branch retains full authority over diplomatic recognition, arms sale approvals, and military commitments, meaning the resolution creates no enforceable obligation on the President.
Historical precedent
Congress has passed numerous resolutions reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act since its enactment in 1979, including bipartisan resolutions marking its 40th anniversary in 2019, establishing a consistent pattern of non-binding congressional reaffirmation.