EO-14358
Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent With the Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China
- Signed
- Nov 4, 2025
- Published
- Nov 7, 2025
Federal Register: 2025-19826
Source: Federal Register.
Extends Suspension of High China Tariffs Under US-China Trade Deal
Impact9/10
What it does
This order continues the suspension of elevated tariff rates on Chinese imports — rates that had previously reached as high as 145% — and instead maintains a 10% additional tariff rate on those imports through November 10, 2026. It implements a bilateral trade arrangement (the "Kuala Lumpur Joint Arrangement") reached between the U.S. and China on October 30, 2025. The order also directs senior cabinet officials to monitor China's compliance with its commitments and authorizes the president to reimpose higher tariffs if China fails to follow through.
Who benefits
U.S. importers and retailers who rely on Chinese-made goods and components, as lower tariffs reduce their input costs. U.S. consumers who would otherwise face higher prices on goods with Chinese-sourced parts. U.S. agricultural producers — particularly soybean, sorghum, and timber farmers — who gain a committed Chinese buyer for their exports. U.S. semiconductor companies that had faced Chinese retaliatory restrictions. Industries dependent on rare earth elements and critical minerals, including defense contractors, electric vehicle manufacturers, and electronics producers. Small businesses that import finished goods or components from China.
Who is affected
U.S. domestic manufacturers who compete directly with Chinese imports and had benefited from the protection of higher tariff rates. Workers in import-competing industries such as steel, aluminum, textiles, and electronics assembly. Domestic rare earth mining and processing companies that had anticipated reduced Chinese competition. Advocates for a harder line on trade with China who view the arrangement as insufficient. U.S. trading partners who had adjusted their own supply chains in anticipation of sustained high tariffs on China. Federal revenue projections that had assumed higher tariff collections.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Kuala Lumpur Arrangement secures concrete, tangible concessions from China — including commitments to purchase U.S. agricultural goods, suspend retaliatory tariffs on U.S. farm products, and roll back export controls on rare earth elements critical to U.S. defense and manufacturing. They contend that IEEPA grants the president broad authority to modify tariff rates in response to a declared national emergency, and that a negotiated reduction in trade barriers is precisely the kind of flexible, results-oriented use of that authority the statute was designed to enable.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that suspending elevated tariffs removes the primary source of leverage over China before its commitments have been verified, and that the arrangement's terms — many of which are time-limited to late 2026 — do not constitute a durable structural change in trade relations. They contend that using IEEPA to impose and then selectively suspend tariffs as a negotiating tool stretches the statute beyond its intended emergency scope, and that under the major-questions doctrine established in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), such sweeping trade authority may require clearer and more specific congressional authorization.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order cites the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., and the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. §1601 et seq., as the primary statutory delegations of authority, building on the national emergency declared in EO 14257. It also cites Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2483) and Section 301 of Title 3, U.S.C., which authorizes presidential delegation of functions. These statutes operate as delegations of Congress's Article I commerce and foreign-trade powers to the executive. This order is reversible by a future president and does not require congressional action to modify or rescind.