EO-14380
Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba
- Signed
- Jan 29, 2026
- Published
- Feb 3, 2026
Federal Register: 2026-02250
Source: Federal Register.
Tariffs on Countries That Sell Oil to Cuba, Citing National Emergency
What it does
This order declares a national emergency based on the Cuban government's alleged support for hostile foreign governments and transnational groups, and its human rights practices. It directs the Secretary of Commerce to identify any foreign country that sells or provides oil — directly or indirectly — to Cuba, and authorizes the President to impose additional import tariffs on goods from those countries. The tariff rate and scope are not fixed in the order itself; they would be determined through a multi-step review process involving the Secretaries of Commerce and State before the President makes a final decision.
Who benefits
U.S. national security and foreign policy officials seeking leverage over Cuba's energy supply. Domestic manufacturers and workers in industries that compete with imports from countries that could be targeted by tariffs. Cuban civil society and political dissidents, to the extent the order is intended to pressure the Cuban government. U.S. energy producers who may gain market share if Cuba's oil supply is disrupted. Advocates for democratic governance in Cuba and the broader Western Hemisphere.
Who is affected
U.S. importers, retailers, and businesses that source goods from countries that sell oil to Cuba — potentially including major oil-exporting nations such as Russia, Venezuela, or others. U.S. consumers who could face higher prices on imported goods if tariffs are imposed. Third-party countries caught in the middle of U.S.-Cuba policy who trade oil through intermediaries. Cuban civilians who depend on oil for basic energy needs. Small and mid-size U.S. businesses reliant on global supply chains from potentially targeted countries. Foreign companies and governments facing uncertainty about whether their trade with Cuba triggers U.S. tariffs.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Cuba's hosting of Russian signals intelligence facilities and its deepening ties with China, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah represent a concrete and proximate threat to U.S. national security, justifying emergency economic measures. They contend that IEEPA grants the president broad authority to regulate international commerce in response to declared foreign threats, and that targeting Cuba's oil supply is a proportionate tool to pressure the regime without direct military action. They further argue that the order's graduated, multi-step review process — requiring findings by the Secretary of Commerce and recommendations by the Secretary of State before any tariff is imposed — reflects a measured and deliberate use of executive power.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the order's tariff mechanism targets third-party countries — not Cuba directly — potentially penalizing U.S. allies and trading partners for routine commercial activity, and raising questions about whether IEEPA was intended for this type of secondary-sanctions-style pressure. They contend that the order's broad definition of "indirectly" providing oil, which includes sales through intermediaries with mere knowledge that oil "may" reach Cuba, creates legal ambiguity that could sweep in a wide range of global actors. They further argue that the order delegates significant tariff-setting discretion to executive branch officials without clear congressional authorization, which critics say may conflict with the major-questions doctrine established in recent Supreme Court precedent requiring Congress to speak clearly before the executive claims authority over matters of vast economic significance.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order cites the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (NEA, 50 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.) as its primary statutory authority, both of which are congressional delegations of power to the president to regulate international economic transactions during a declared national emergency. It also draws on the president's Article II foreign affairs powers, including the Reception Clause (Art. II, §3) and the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1), which courts have recognized as granting broad presidential discretion in matters of foreign policy and national security. A future president could revoke this order, and it supplements — rather than replaces — existing Cuba sanctions legislation such as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton).