EO-14391
Adjusting Certain Delegations Under the Defense Production Act
- Signed
- Mar 13, 2026
- Published
- Mar 18, 2026
Federal Register: 2026-05382
Source: Federal Register.
Expands Energy Dept. Authority Under Defense Production Act
Impact3/10
What it does
This order modifies a 2012 executive order (EO 13603) to give the Secretary of Energy independent authority to act under the Defense Production Act — authority previously held only by the Secretary of Commerce. It also clarifies that agency heads do not need to seek presidential approval before acting when they already have delegated authority under existing executive orders, including those related to the 2025 national energy emergency declaration.
Who benefits
The Department of Energy, which gains new independent authority to direct industrial resources for national defense and energy purposes. Energy sector companies that may receive faster agency decisions without waiting for presidential referral. Defense contractors and suppliers whose requests can now be processed by either Commerce or Energy. Federal officials seeking clearer guidance on when presidential sign-off is required.
Who is affected
The Department of Commerce, which previously held sole authority under the amended section and now shares it. Industries subject to Defense Production Act directives, which may now receive orders from a second agency. Congressional oversight committees that monitor DPA authority, who now have a broader executive footprint to track. Businesses in energy-related supply chains that could be subject to DPA production priorities or allocation orders from the Energy Department.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that energy infrastructure is now central to national defense and that giving the Secretary of Energy independent DPA authority reflects that reality, allowing faster and more expert responses to supply chain disruptions without bureaucratic bottlenecks. They contend the President has broad constitutional and statutory authority under the DPA and Article II to reorganize how delegated powers are distributed among cabinet officials.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that expanding DPA authority to a second agency without congressional action risks duplicating or conflicting directives to industry, creating regulatory confusion. They contend that the clarification reducing the need for presidential referral further insulates significant economic interventions from direct presidential accountability, and that the DPA's broad powers over private industry warrant tighter, not looser, chains of command.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. §4501 et seq.) is the primary statutory authority, which Congress enacted as a delegation of its Article I commerce and war powers to the executive branch. The President's authority to sub-delegate these powers to agency heads derives from the DPA itself and the Article II Vesting Clause. The order also draws on the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) insofar as DPA authority supports national defense readiness.