EO-14421
Declaring a National Emergency To Secure the United States Bulk-Power System
- Signed
- Aug 26, 2026
- Published
- Aug 31, 2026
Federal Register: 2026-17843
Source: Federal Register.
National Emergency to Restrict Foreign Equipment in the Power Grid
Impact7/10
What it does
This order declares a national emergency over foreign-made equipment used in the U.S. electric power grid, citing risks of cyberattack and supply disruption. It directs the Secretary of Energy to block new purchases, imports, or installations of grid equipment tied to certain foreign countries or entities, and gives authority to require replacement, isolation, or removal of already-installed foreign equipment. It also directs future changes to federal purchasing rules to favor U.S.-manufactured energy infrastructure.
Who benefits
Domestic manufacturers of transformers, generators, circuit breakers, and grid control systems; U.S. cybersecurity and critical-infrastructure agencies; utilities that already use domestic equipment; and workers in the U.S. electrical equipment manufacturing sector who could see increased demand.
Who is affected
Electric utilities and grid operators that rely on foreign-made transformers, generators, or control systems, who may face compliance costs, replacement expenses, or delays; foreign equipment manufacturers (particularly from countries designated as Covered Foreign Entities) losing U.S. market access; and potentially electricity ratepayers who could bear higher costs passed through from equipment replacement or supply chain adjustments.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that foreign-controlled equipment embedded in the power grid poses a genuine national security risk, since compromised hardware or software could allow remote sabotage of a system that underpins the entire economy, national defense, and emergency services. They contend that phased, risk-based restrictions with licensing and mitigation options allow the government to close vulnerabilities gradually without abruptly disrupting grid reliability, and that boosting domestic manufacturing reduces dependence on potentially hostile suppliers.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that using emergency powers to restrict a broad category of foreign-made grid equipment could raise electricity costs and slow grid modernization, since domestic suppliers may not have capacity to quickly replace critical components like transformers, which are already in short supply. They contend that vesting broad discretion in the Secretary of Energy to define "Covered Foreign Entities" and order equipment removal, with limited independent review, risks inconsistent enforcement and economic disruption disproportionate to demonstrated threats.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order invokes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), which allow the President to regulate foreign commercial transactions after declaring a national emergency rooted in a foreign-sourced threat, along with 3 U.S.C. 301 delegating authority to agency heads.