Esteras v. United States

Majority — Barrett

Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Sotomayor, Jackson

The majority held that when Congress listed eight of the ten standard sentencing factors in the supervised release statute and left out §3553(a)(2)(A), that omission carries legal weight under the well-established interpretive rule that listing some items from a group implies the unlisted items are excluded. The Court reasoned that this reading is reinforced by the statute's structure: every other sentencing provision in the same law — covering probation, fines, and imprisonment — tells courts to consider all ten factors, but the supervised release provisions uniquely omit the retribution factor. The majority also pointed to the purpose of supervised release itself, which prior Supreme Court decisions have described as a tool for rehabilitation and reintegration, not as additional punishment for the original crime. The Court rejected the government's argument that the list is merely a floor of required factors while leaving judges free to consider others, finding that reading would make Congress's deliberate omission meaningless. Finally, the Court addressed how appeals courts should handle violations of this rule, explaining that defendants who object at the hearing get full review, while those who do not object face the harder "plain error" standard on appeal.

Dissent reasoning

The dissent argued that the majority misapplied the interpretive canon it relied on — the rule that listing some items implies others are excluded — because that canon normally means the listed items are the only mandatory ones, not that everything else is forbidden. Justice Alito wrote that a more natural reading of the statute is that the eight listed factors are required, while the two omitted factors remain available for judges to consider at their discretion, consistent with the broad sentencing discretion federal judges have traditionally exercised. The dissent also argued that the majority's rule is unworkable in practice, because two of the factors judges must consider — "the nature and circumstances of the offense" and "the need to afford adequate deterrence" — are so closely intertwined with the supposedly forbidden factor that judges cannot meaningfully separate them without performing impossible mental gymnastics. The dissent further noted that when Congress has actually wanted to prohibit judges from considering a sentencing factor, it has said so explicitly in the statute's text, and no such explicit prohibition appears here. Finally, the dissent observed that the majority's own guidance on appellate review — telling judges they can simply reframe or withdraw a stray remark to avoid reversal — reveals that the Court itself doubts the practical value of the rule it just announced.