Docket 24-1159
Pitts v. Mississippi
DecidedNov 24, 2025
Per Curiamdecision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules states cannot use mandatory screening laws to skip case-by-case findings before shielding child witnesses from defendants
Impact3/10
What it does
The Court reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling and held that a mandatory state screening law cannot substitute for the case-by-case hearing and necessity finding the Sixth Amendment requires before a child witness may be shielded from a defendant's view. A trial court must actually hear evidence and make a specific finding — tied to the facts of that particular case — that the child would suffer trauma impairing her ability to testify if forced to face the defendant directly. On remand, the state court may still consider whether the error was harmless and whether a new trial is required.
Who benefits
Criminal defendants in child-abuse cases who have been denied face-to-face confrontation with witnesses based solely on a state statute, without a case-specific judicial finding of necessity.
Who is affected
Child witnesses in abuse cases, prosecutors, and state legislatures whose mandatory witness-screening laws can no longer serve as a standalone basis for blocking a defendant's view of a testifying child.
Practical impact
Trial courts in Mississippi and every other state must now hold an evidentiary hearing and issue a written or on-the-record case-specific finding of necessity before permitting any screen or other device to block a child witness's view of the defendant — a state law mandating such screening is not enough on its own. Prosecutors seeking to use witness-screening procedures must present actual evidence (not just assertions) that the particular child would be traumatized to the point of impaired testimony by facing the defendant directly. On remand, the Mississippi courts will determine whether the constitutional error in Pitts's trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning a new trial is not automatically guaranteed.
Majority reasoning
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause — which normally guarantees a defendant the right to meet accusers face to face — permits screening a child witness from the defendant only when a court hears evidence and makes a finding specific to that case that the child would suffer trauma impairing her ability to testify. The Court reasoned that a mandatory state statute, even one grounded in the legislature's general findings about child trauma, cannot replace that individualized judicial determination. The Court rejected each of the Mississippi Supreme Court's attempts to distinguish its prior rulings in Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig: the state constitution's victims' rights provision cannot override the federal Constitution; a mandatory statute is actually more constitutionally problematic than a discretionary one, not less; the child's young age (four years old) is a relevant factor but does not eliminate the need for a case-specific hearing; the fact that the defendant's identity was undisputed does not automatically trigger the child-abuse exception; and using an in-courtroom screen rather than a separate room with closed-circuit television still deviates from the face-to-face default and still requires a necessity finding. The Court also rejected the State's fallback argument that the prosecution's unsworn representation — that the child's guardian believed testifying face-to-face would be difficult — combined with the judge's reliance on the mandatory statute, satisfied the required procedures.
Constitutional question
Does the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause require a trial court to hold a hearing and make a case-specific finding of necessity before allowing a screen to block a child witness's view of the defendant, even when a state law makes such screening mandatory?
Precedent changed
The ruling applies and reaffirms Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); it does not overrule them but explicitly rejects the Mississippi Supreme Court's attempts to narrow or distinguish them.